

The Hispanic Priority

*THE SPANISH-LANGUAGE TELEVISION BATTLE FOR THE HISPANIC
VOTE IN THE 2000 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION*

*BUSH VERSUS GORE: MILLION DOLLAR COMPETING PAID AND EARNED MEDIA CAMPAIGNS
FOCUSED ON PROVIDING THE CRITICAL EDGE*

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INTRODUCTION

Hispanic American voters, who are identified as voting-age United States citizens of Latin American or Spanish descent, have played important roles in recent U.S. presidential elections.¹ The community's growth over the past two decades has had a notable impact on the composition of the electorate. Representing 7% of all voters² and 12.5% of the U.S. population in 2000,³ Hispanics now account for 13% of the population⁴ and represent the largest *potential* ethnic voting-bloc in America. African Americans comprised 12.3% of the U.S. population in 2000⁵ (now 12.7% of the population⁶), but have consistently voted with greater frequency than Hispanics. They represented 10% of the vote in 2000.⁷ More than twenty-three million Hispanics of voting age now reside in the U.S.⁸ and there are now over 37 million Hispanic Americans⁹ (see Appendix II). The number of Hispanics in America rose 58 percent during the last decade, and growth rates are not expected to slow in the near future (see Appendix III).¹⁰ Between April 1, 2000 and July 1, 2001 the Hispanic population in the U.S. grew by 1.7 million, a 4.7% increase in just over one year.¹¹

Political analysts refer to this non-homogeneous community as the "sleeping giant" of American politics. With more than a third of the population younger than the 18 year-old national voting age, the Hispanic community is the most rapid-growth segment of the U.S. population and potential voting population. This impending political force will command the single most important non-regional voting bloc in American politics during the next presidential election.¹² According to the Pew Hispanic Center in Washington, DC, if the millions of non-citizen voting-age Hispanics living in the U.S. gained citizenship and registered to vote the number of Hispanic voters would double.¹³

One need only look at recent elections to comprehend the expanding voting power of this community. More Hispanic voters participated in the 1996 presidential election than during any past election, and they did so at a greater rate than at any previous time. In that year they represented 5% of all voters, a rate that rose by nearly 40% to almost 7% in 2000.¹⁴ The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) liberally predicts that the number of Hispanic voters could reach 9 million in 2004, a fifty percent increase over 2000 and a potentially significant increase as a percentage of the U.S. voting population.¹⁵ *The Washington Post* reported on the Pew study noting that the study found, "Nearly one in four registered Hispanics is between 18 and 29 years old, and 13 percent of all Hispanic voters became naturalized after 1996, reflecting both a younger and a faster-growing population of voters. Since 2000, the survey found, the Hispanic population of eligible voters has grown by 700,000, making it one of the fastest-growing groups in the country."¹⁶

In "battleground" and "swing" states and congressional districts, this community has the ability to influence the outcome of some of the nation's most important federal and state elections, with national implications. With a growing population and gains from this year's congressional redistricting, the community's perceived and actual political power is rising each year. Hispanic political clout is expected to grow as a result of the 2002 midterm elections, though the results demonstrate a further delay in the large gains of Hispanics in the U.S. Congress that had been widely predicted before recent district reapportionments throughout the

country.¹⁷

Political parties and presidential candidates have long foreseen the potential value of the increasing Hispanic population and the community's growing political power, and have devoted significant resources toward earning immediate and longer-term political support of Hispanic voters, community leaders, and elected officials. The Democratic National Committee, Republican National Committee, and their national and state affiliates have both devoted millions of dollars to voter registration, education, mobilization efforts and even Spanish-language proficiency courses for elected officials, candidates, and activists.

The 2000 Campaign

In the months leading up to the 2000 presidential election, both leading presidential candidates, Republican Texas Governor George W. Bush and Democratic Vice President Al Gore, Jr., recognized that the election would be incredibly close in key battleground states. This factor added a new level of importance to targeted groups of “base” voters and “swing” voters that their campaigns believed could be critical for earning the deciding votes on Election Day. As a result, the Republican and Democratic candidates and national political party organizations devoted millions of dollars to efforts to reach Hispanic voters. Though recent spending and party pledges for these efforts dwarf spending during the 2000 election, at the time the spending was considered to be near record levels and the media hailed the party efforts as historic.

A focus of the 2000 campaign was on efforts to target undecided Hispanic voters in battleground states through a Spanish-language television media campaign. With significant funding and strategically allocated resources, this effort comprised funds and resources devoted toward both paid advertising and earned media (free coverage on news broadcasts, television entertainment programs, and a wide range of other news media opportunities). The effort to target Hispanics and other key constituencies among the electorate involved millions of dollars in paid political television advertising, though it was only a small portion of the tens of millions of dollars spent nationally on behalf of the candidates. According to the Wisconsin Advertising Project at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, general election television advertising aired on behalf of Bush cost at least \$86 million and ads aired on behalf of Gore cost at least \$77 million.¹⁸

Over the last twenty years the modern presidential campaign has used television to reach groups of voters during each election cycle, with considerable spending increases associated with each competitive race. Campaigns are now spending roughly 85% of their funds on broadcast “spot” television ads.¹⁹ In addition to television spots and other forms of advertising that remotely reach voters in their homes, campaigns have also relied upon more labor intensive, person-to-person efforts such as voter registration, voter education, and voter mobilization/get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives to earn the critical votes.

The close finale to the 2000 presidential campaign, and the protracted Florida recount, highlighted the power and importance of small groups of voters in battleground states. The decisions made by the campaign organizations and candidates throughout each stage of the campaign had major impacts that were amplified in key states on Election Day. With post-

election surveys and results showing that voters were almost evenly split between support for Democrats and Republicans in key gubernatorial, House and Senate races in 2002, and analysts are already predicting another close presidential election in 2004, the lessons from 2000 have major implications for the campaigns of the future. When combined with the growing political importance of Hispanic voters, research into this topic becomes one of national importance.

In an effort to analyze and understand the paid media campaigns (accounting for more than four-fifths of total campaign spending) employed by the candidates to reach Hispanic voters during the 2000 campaign, this research sought to determine: **(1) How did the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates and their affiliated party organizations use paid Spanish-language television advertisements to court Hispanic voters during the 2000 election? What strategies did they employ? What unique Spanish-language television ads were developed by each campaign and party organization? Where were they placed and how much money did they cost? (2) With new evidence suggesting the increasing importance of capturing the Hispanic vote, what can be predicted for the future of these media campaigns? (3) What are the larger issues illuminated by the thorough, yet narrow, research into Spanish-language media campaigns?**

This study will focus almost exclusively on paid Spanish-language campaign television advertising, the single most dominant, expensive, and effective means of communicating with Spanish-speaking Hispanic voters. Separate research would be valuable to understand the full impact and coordination related to efforts to reach Hispanic voters by radio, direct mail, automated phone calls, print media (such as newspapers and magazines), the Internet, and door-to-door electioneering. Each of these outreach techniques have contributed to election victories across the nation, so it can be expected that these efforts have played important roles in earning the votes of Hispanic Americans and will be valuable resources in the future.

While the spending devoted to political campaign advertising has been rising on a yearly basis – and further increases are anticipated – the record levels of spending on paid political advertising on Spanish-language television networks and affiliates at all levels of political campaigns is of special note if unique trends can be identified.

The types of ads candidates are running, including the issues discussed, tone, images, and other variables, add further options for analyzing the strategies employed by the campaigns in 2000. In-depth interviews with the top campaign officials and ad-makers reveal the strategies behind the efforts and complement data obtained through research for this report.

SOURCES OF RESEARCH

Two primary sources of research comprise the existing knowledge about candidate and political party efforts to win the support of Hispanic voters.

First, political scientists, sociologists, and other academic researchers have been conducting studies on this topic for more than a decade. While most academic researchers involved with this topic have attempted to capture the totality of outreach to Hispanic voters, few detailed and well-cited accounts of the Spanish-language television-advertising campaigns are in existence. Available studies lack comprehensive data or sophisticated technology to track advertising and spending that target Hispanic voters. Academic journal articles and books can be found on the topic of presidential campaign communications efforts as well as on the broader subject of Hispanics and American politics.

Some valuable works in this field have been published by political scientists Rodolfo de la Garza and Louis DeSipio (1999, 1996, and 1992).²⁰ Their works are referenced in the issue history section. Federico A. Subervi-Velez, at the University of Texas, has contributed to this field, particularly in the realm of Republican and Democratic mass communication strategies to reach Hispanic voters (1999, 1992).²¹ Laurien Alexandre of Antioch University and Henrik Reh binder of *La Opinion*, the nation's largest Spanish-language daily newspaper, contributed substantive research of news coverage on Spanish-language television with their *Media Watch* during the 2000 campaign.²² Reports on Spanish-language television advertising during the 2002 campaign contribute to further substantive data and research that help influence conclusions in this report (Segal, 2002).²³ Many of the other academic sources treat the media effort as merely one limited aspect of a year-long program of outreach to the Hispanic community, and none adequately identify the importance of the television advertising efforts or the internal strategies, issues, and funding that drove the organized media campaigns. Existing research is full of holes in data on paid Spanish-language advertising. Publications following each election cycle have failed to report the totality of presidential-level Spanish-language advertising and have failed to adequately discuss the implications.

Second, research has been conducted by political campaign professionals (including media consultants and pollsters), pundits, and political journalists who report on campaigns by sharing information in the nation's political capital, via the Internet and through research mediums where it is available to be analyzed by political professionals and other interested individuals across the country. News organizations and publications – such as *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Miami Herald*, *Associated Press*, *National Journal*, and CNN's *Inside Politics* program, to name a few – report on the details of national campaign politics, including efforts to reach Hispanic voters, and aim their coverage toward political elites. Previous research and analysis can be found archived on the Internet, in private pay-for-use online media databases such as Dow Jones Interactive, LexisNexis and National Journal Group's *Hotline*, and in university libraries in the District of Columbia and Baltimore, Maryland. Like most other original sources of research, studies by pundits and political professionals provide reports about campaign-sponsored announcements of Hispanic outreach efforts. Journalists, such as those involved with the National Journal Group's *Ad Spotlight* project, which tracks and

archives political ads each year, catalogue information from press and campaign releases, interview campaign and political party spokespeople, and enhance their own research with other news reports. Too often these sources only provide reports on what the campaigns told them about the advertising strategies and the advertising buys, rather than conducting extensive independent research.

Researchers and sociologists, such as Roberto Suro of the Pew Hispanic Center, have articulated the frustrations of a struggling community not yet fully integrated into the American society and not yet taking advantage of the political power now available. While efforts to reach Hispanic voters have been the focus of political journalists over the past decade, very few news stories have examined the full television advertising campaigns aimed at Hispanic voters. When information from numerous incomplete reports is brought together, only a blurry picture of the important trends in this area is formed. Despite some resulting confusion, a cursory analysis of the trends of *yearly* local, state, and national news reports identifies the successively increasing attention paid to Hispanic voters by political campaigns. All of this information can both complement and supplement the awareness that will be gained through the extensive new research conducted for this project.

ISSUE HISTORY

The first available record of a Spanish-language television advertisement in a presidential campaign is one aired in 1960 by the campaign of Senator John F. Kennedy. According to a report published by the National Endowment for the Humanities, Kennedy's campaign ran television and radio ads that featured his wife, Jacqueline Kennedy, speaking Spanish directly to viewers.²⁴

Large-scale use of Spanish-language television ads in presidential campaigns dates back to the 1980 campaign of former Republican California Governor Ronald Reagan. The campaign hired Lionel Sosa, a young media consultant, to help devise an advertising strategy to reach Hispanics. Reagan, having served as Governor of the state with the largest Hispanic population, understood the growing importance of the Hispanic vote and the value of a bilingual campaign strategy. According to former Republican National Committee Deputy Press Secretary Leslie Sanchez, Reagan's campaign spent between \$330,000 and \$400,000 on the first major Spanish-language broadcast ad-buy in presidential campaign history during his 1984 re-election campaign.²⁵ The Democratic Party spent approximately \$120,000 on efforts to reach Hispanics that year.²⁶

Bush v. Dukakis in 1988

During the 1988 presidential campaign, Vice President George H. W. Bush's campaign and the Republican Party ran a "centralized" effort that sought to draw support from Hispanic voters. The campaign assembled *Hispanics for Bush*, a grassroots constituency program, and coordinated a series of polls and focus groups to determine the campaign's message toward the community and the communications strategy.²⁷ The Bush team devised an intricate plan to target radio and print media across the nation, in addition to surrogate and paid media efforts focused on earning valuable contact with voters. The campaign ran only four unique Spanish-language ads; three produced and funded by the RNC and one funded by the Bush-Quayle campaign. The campaign aired two sets of the same ads; Spanish-language ads ran during national programming on the leading Spanish-language Univision and Telemundo networks and English versions of these ads also ran on English television networks with high Hispanic audience ratings. One academic source reported that the Bush-Quayle organization spent \$6 million on the Hispanic communications and outreach efforts, aired more than \$4 million in ads,²⁸ and outspent the Dukakis team on Hispanic ads by at least 4-1.²⁹ However, these spending numbers appear to be inflated.

The less successful campaign of Massachusetts Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis had only one edge over the Bush media campaign: Dukakis was fluent in Spanish and could speak directly to Hispanic voters in his ads. But the campaign was bogged down by bureaucracy when strategists put unsubstantial financial backing behind efforts by three different groups of Hispanic media experts to produce winning ads. The campaign produced at least five Spanish-language television ads, most of which contained footage of Dukakis speaking directly to Hispanic voters in Spanish. In their strategic tradeoff, the campaign and Party spent less than \$1

million on television ads targeting Hispanic voters.³⁰ At the time, Dukakis' strategists considered Hispanic voters to be a natural Democratic constituency unlikely to swing toward Bush. In responses to requests for interviews for this project, both Dukakis' campaign manager, Susan Estrich, and communications adviser, Leslie Dach, said that they had no knowledge of any Spanish-language television campaign efforts,³¹ calling into question the possibility that funding for these ads reached anywhere near the \$1 million mark.

Clinton v. Bush in 1992

In the 1992 presidential campaign, which positioned President George Bush against Democratic Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, the two campaigns had markedly different Hispanic media strategies. While both campaign organizations created grassroots Hispanic committees, *Adelante con Clinton!* and *Viva Bush!*, the overall strategies and resource allocations were dissimilar.

The Clinton campaign only ran Spanish-language television advertisements extensively in New York in response to negative ads by Bush.³² While the Clinton campaign largely relied upon English media to reach Hispanic voters, the Bush campaign spent millions of dollars on Spanish-language television advertising in Illinois, Texas, New Mexico, Colorado and less so in New York and California. The Bush campaign's Hispanic television effort in Florida was handled by a committee of Cuban Americans in that state.³³ In an effort to earn free media coverage, the campaigns organized surrogate tours for high profile Hispanic supporters. During the tours, prominent Hispanics conducted television, radio, and print news interviews in Spanish and English. They appeared at dozens of public events on behalf of the candidates in the key battleground states. Similar to the Bush-Cheney campaign of 2000, the 1992 Bush campaign relied upon George P. Bush and other Hispanic family members and Republican elected officials to present a *friendly face* to the Hispanic community. The Clinton campaign coordinated similar efforts using prominent and successful Hispanic leaders such as popular activist Henry Cisneros,³⁴ who later became President Clinton's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and, later, a Spanish-language television network executive.

Clinton v. Dole in 1996

Hispanic voters turned out in historic numbers in 1996, supporting Clinton by a wide margin and rejecting Republican Kansas Senator Bob Dole and his Party's links to immigration opponents including Patrick Buchanan and California Governor Pete Wilson. Among the most significant victories for the Clinton-Gore team in 1996 was a win in the Florida general election. After losing the state in 1992, the campaign aggressively courted Cuban American voters and earned sufficient support to make the difference.³⁵ Among efforts to publicly demonstrate closeness to the Hispanic community, the Clinton campaign had the President introduced in Spanish at political rallies with Hispanics in California and other states.³⁶ The campaign ran a number of Spanish language ads in Florida produced by New Mexico-based Armando Gutierrez & Associates, a consulting firm that both the Gore campaign and DNC used during different stages of the 2000 campaign.³⁷ The 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign and the DNC spent more than

\$1.1 million on Spanish-language television advertising in 1996 (see Appendix I).³⁸ In addition to Gutierrez, the campaign commissioned Spanish-language television ads through Wiscovitch Associates, a Hispanic advertising firm based in New York.³⁹ Additionally, the campaign aggressively courted Hispanic media and earned significant amounts of free coverage, especially surrounding the immigration issue. Similar victories for Clinton among Hispanic voters across the country were credited with Clinton's large margin of victory on Election Day.

Dole's campaign ran an ineffective campaign among Hispanic voters in Florida and nationally. Roughly 70,000 Cuban voters switched – from their votes in 1992 for President Bush – to support Clinton in 1996. The shift was attributed to Clinton's strong foreign policy stance against Fidel Castro and the Cuban government; strong domestic policy stance in support of friendly immigration policies; personal outreach to the community; and prolific campaign spending in the state. The Clinton-Gore campaign outspent the Dole-Kemp slate by 3-1 on television in Florida, according to one report.⁴⁰ Clinton's landslide victories among Hispanic voters in California, Arizona, and Nevada were also influenced by effective use of the media campaign to capitalize on similar wedge issues and an effective use of Spanish-language television advertising.⁴¹

Dole's campaign position and voting record on immigration policies, including his support for federal legislation listing English as the only official language in the U.S., distinguished him from President Clinton. Clinton, who had a financial advantage, dominated the airwaves throughout the campaign with positive advertisements focused on job creation and national unity; and negative ads about Dole's stance on immigration and economic policies. In the final days of the campaign, when the media battle escalated, the Clinton-Gore campaign outspent the Dole-Kemp campaign by a 2-1 margin on television advertising. Clinton's ad buys included significant exposure on Hispanic television and radio stations with audiences across the Southwest.⁴² The campaign spent heavily in Arizona (\$175,000), New Mexico (\$110,000), and Nevada (total not available).⁴³ As a result of Clinton's funding allocations, strategy, and issue positions, and the Dole-Kemp campaign's failure to appeal to Hispanics, Senator Dole received fewer Hispanic votes than any Republican presidential candidate in 25 years.⁴⁴ The defeat among Hispanics embarrassed the Republican establishment and ultimately influenced the early efforts to draft Texas Governor George W. Bush, popular among his state's Hispanic communities and conversant in Spanish, to run for the presidency in 2000.

Bush v. Gore in 2000

Paid political advertising played a decisive role in the 2000 presidential campaign as it has for almost every recent modern presidential election during the past three decades. In the course of the 2000 race, the leading campaign organizations – established for the Republicans, Governor George W. Bush and former Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, and the Democrats, Vice President Albert Gore, Jr. and Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman – spent a combined \$67.1 million on television advertisements in the general election. In addition, between the RNC and DNC \$79.9 million was spent on television ads in the presidential campaign.⁴⁵ Not surprisingly, more money was spent on combined political advertising in 2000, including significant Spanish-language advertising, than ever before.

According to a *National Journal Inc.* analysis of 1,768 unique campaign television advertisements that ran in the 2000 campaign, at least 23 different Spanish-language ads were aired in various political races across the nation, and more than half were created by the presidential campaigns or their parties. To put this number in context, 173 unique television spots ran in support of Bush, while 160 ran in support of Gore during the 2000 campaign. Despite these large numbers, it is noteworthy that presidential campaign ads comprised only 32 percent of spending on all campaign ads aired during the 2000 cycle.⁴⁶

In the closing weeks of the 2000 election, as the campaign organizations sought to aggressively mobilize their base voters and reach key swing voter blocs, both the Gore and Bush teams scrambled to place Spanish-language ads on local television and radio stations in select battleground states, according to interviews conducted with officials and new data developed for this project. This included ads broadcast in Florida, New Mexico, Nevada and other states with significant Hispanic populations where polling showed the candidates in dead-heats. News reports and an interview with a former Party official concluded that the RNC alone paid for over \$4 million in Spanish-language television ads in 2000, a significant figure,⁴⁷ but one the research calls into question. For the first time in U.S. campaign history the political parties outspent their presidential candidates in advertising in 2000, primarily using "soft money."⁴⁸ Spanish-language television advertising was no exception.

From its inception, the Bush campaign promised an unprecedented Hispanic outreach program and an intention to run historic amounts of Spanish-language television ads in key Hispanic states. "Our campaign was almost exclusively television, we had limited dollars," said Bush campaign media consultant Lionel Sosa. "In the [Texas] Gubernatorial campaign we ran a lot of radio. If I have to choose between TV and radio, I choose TV. With TV you can see him and see other Hispanics relate to him, putting his arm around them, seeing the reaction."

In a decision that ultimately may have won Bush the presidency, his campaign and the RNC heavily targeted the Spanish-language television stations in Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, Orlando, and Tampa as part of an aggressive strategy to win the state of Florida⁴⁹ and its 25 electoral votes (out of 538 total).⁵⁰ Bush's advisers knew that an unprecedented Hispanic strategy would be needed to reverse gains made by the Clinton-Gore ticket in 1996 and to compensate for the shifting demographics of the state. Confident of his statewide popularity, the Bush team relied upon Governor Jeb Bush's statewide political organization to help win the state.

In one supportive campaign ad filmed for his brother, Jeb Bush sat with his Hispanic wife, Columba, and said, "I'm proud of the Latino blood that flows in the Bush family."⁵¹ George W. Bush spoke Spanish at dozens of public events across the state of Florida and around the country, as did his brother, Jeb, nephew George P. and other high-profile surrogates. George W. Bush also sat down for private interviews with an array of Spanish-language media in an aggressive courting of Hispanic voters, especially Cuban Americans, throughout the primaries and the general election.⁵²

The RNC was responsible for a significant earned media effort in support of Bush. During the 18 months of the presidential campaign the RNC reportedly coordinated 2,200 interviews with Hispanic media organizations using 43 surrogates. In addition, the Party

coordinated more than 200 of these interviews at the three and a half-day Republican National Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during the summer of 2000.⁵³

The Gore campaign also aggressively targeted Hispanic voters with Spanish-language television ads and relied upon support from the DNC and third party organizations. In addition to the efforts outlined in this report, the Gore campaign hired the Washington-based QRS Newmedia firm to coordinate earned media efforts. QRS's entire staff moved to Nashville and helped oversee the campaign's earned media operations from inside the campaign's headquarters in Nashville. The company created a cluster of television and radio studios in the office to allow campaign officials to participate in interviews live from the campaign headquarters. QRS reported that it produced 19 Hispanic satellite media tours and four satellite feeds of Hispanic events that were offered to networks and stations across the country. This involved hiring film crews, satellite truck operators, and purchasing satellite time. According to QRS, these efforts earned 72 usages on local Spanish-language television broadcasts in 19 targeted Spanish-language television markets. In addition, the campaign fed 242 radio actualities to stations in 29 targeted markets and facilitated 105 talk radio interviews in 26 radio markets. During the four presidential and vice presidential debates the campaign arranged 10 satellite media tours, 33 satellite interviews, six talk radio media tours, and 15 talk radio interviews.⁵⁴

For the first time in presidential campaign history, large-scale third-party Spanish-language television ads were aired in the 2000 presidential campaign.⁵⁵ The Sierra Club, a liberal environmental membership organization, was the most active special interest group that ran such ads. The group ran more than \$270,000 in ads attacking Bush in California, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico and other states. While the DNC and Sierra Club attacked Bush using Spanish-language television advertisements, the Gore campaign's ads remained positive.

Gore's record as Vice President and his connection to President Clinton was a mixed blessing. Clinton assisted the Gore campaign by publicly calling for amnesty of illegal immigrants, drawing front page coverage in Hispanic newspapers and network television news attention across the nation.⁵⁶ However, pollsters and advisers to both candidates agreed that the Clinton Administration's involvement in the Elian Gonzalez scandal cost Gore dearly in vote-rich Miami, Florida and made an effort to replicate Clinton's 1996 outreach to the Cuban community impossible.

STAKEHOLDERS, PLAYERS, PROCESS

The Candidates

Democratic United States Vice President Al Gore, of Tennessee, and Republican Texas Governor George W. Bush were selected by their parties as the two major party candidates for President of the United States in 2000. After relatively easy primary contests, the two leading candidates reorganized their campaigns and prepared for a national contest. Each candidate assembled skilled campaign staffs and established teams of consultants and charged them with the mission to, among other things, create and place effective Spanish-language television advertisements on the airwaves in key states across the nation.

The Party Organizations

The Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC) represent the national political interests of the two major American political parties. They raise the necessary campaign funds, oversee primary elections, direct the national nominating conventions, and coordinate unified party messages. The donors and constituencies of each political party have a vested interest in the success of party campaign efforts throughout the country. In presidential election years, the DNC and RNC often become extensions of the presidential campaigns by coordinating many fundraising, communications, and field efforts as well as formulating a message for all down-ballot candidates on a national level. With few exceptions, often without regard to legal requirements, they work arm-in-arm, taking advantage of massive campaign finance law loopholes. The extensive campaign spending by the parties on television advertising to support the presidential campaigns in 2000 were largely financed with soft money and other unregulated funds.

The Spanish-language Networks and Stations

The two leading national Spanish-language television networks, Univision and Telemundo, play critical roles in helping political campaigns reach Hispanic voters.

Ratings explain the campaigns' reliance upon these stations. "They are crucial, real powerhouses. Nielsen has rated WLTV [the Miami Univision station] several times being even more watched during primetime than with general market stations. That is an amazing figure," said Pablo Izquierdo, a Hispanic advertising consultant to the Gore campaign. It is a point echoed by a Bush staffer. "The leader, Univision, draws more than 4 million U.S. viewers to at least one of its national news shows, and its credibility was recently proven with an Emmy for reporting," said Leonard Rodriguez, a former Bush campaign staff member and consultant. Real viewership numbers continue to rise rapidly. "Univision's chief competitor, Telemundo, is also undergoing phenomenal growth," according to a recent news report. "In Los Angeles and Houston, Univision's local Spanish-language newscasts now receive higher ratings than any single English language news broadcast at the same times."⁵⁷

There are a number of important reasons for such high ratings on the major Spanish-language television networks and local affiliates. In many markets there are very few television options for Hispanics who primarily, or exclusively, speak Spanish. Another important reason is that Hispanics watch more television than other groups of Americans. Nielsen Media Research estimated that in 2000-2001 there were 8.94 million Hispanic-American television households and 4.55 million Spanish-Dominant television households in the U.S. Just four years earlier, in 1996, the company estimated there were 7.51 million total Hispanic television households and 3.54 million Spanish-Dominant households.⁵⁸ Nielsen also reported that “Hispanic-American TV households (both total Hispanic-American households and Spanish-Dominant households) watch more television on average each week (Hours:Minutes per household per week) than Total U.S. TV households.”⁵⁹ Furthermore, Nielsen found that Hispanic-American households watch more television than total U.S. homes in Primetime (17:28 to 13:15) and in Daytime (10:05 to 8:02) across virtually all age groups. However, the company determined that Hispanics watch less television in late-night than total U.S. homes.⁶⁰

Since 2000 there has been an explosion of Spanish-language broadcast and cable television stations, highlighting the growing consumer demand for these stations and the wide interest nationally. This creates many new stations and variables for researchers to examine during future elections.

Numerous studies have indicated that Spanish-language advertising is much more effective when trying to reach Hispanics than English advertising. One study, by the Roslow Research Group in 2000, is cited by advertising companies as evidence of the importance of Spanish-language advertising. The study found that (a) “commercials in Spanish are 40% more effective at increasing ad awareness levels than are commercials in English,” (b) “ads received in Spanish are twice as persuasive as ads received in English,” and (c) “when it comes to message communication, commercials in Spanish are 16% more effective than commercials in English.”⁶¹

While the strategy of advertising on Spanish-language television remains critically important to winning the Hispanic vote, a recent poll helps explain how Hispanics choose to get their news and why campaigns often have a bilingual approach to the Hispanic community. Referring to a recent poll conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center, *The New York Times* reported that, “About half of Latino voters said they got their news on television in English. Twenty-seven percent said they watch English and Spanish news, and 19 percent tune in to Spanish newscasts most of the time.”⁶² This accounts for why the campaigns ran bilingual advertisements and relied upon English advertising and earned media tours with Hispanic supporters to reach thousands of Hispanic voters in the battleground states.

Univision Communications Inc. and Telemundo Networks (recently purchased for \$2 billion by NBC) represent the two leading national Spanish-language television networks with affiliates located in the largest Hispanic communities across the country. Profits at Univision rose 24% in the first half of 2002, marking almost \$500 million in advertising sales. Univision owns or has affiliations with dozens of stations in the 9 states with the largest Hispanic populations and 41 stations nationally. The company owns two other network formats, TeleFutura and Galvavision. Univision is carried on about 1200 cable systems and stations nationwide, reaches over 95% of all Hispanic households in the U.S., and has an 84% average

share of the primetime Spanish-speaking Hispanic television audience in America, according to numerous industry reports.⁶³ With more than 40 broadcast affiliates, ten network owned stations, two cable television networks, and airing on about 550 cable systems and stations, Telemundo reaches 88% of Hispanic television households or more than 9 million potential viewers, but only receives about 15% of the share of primetime viewers. The third largest Spanish language network, Hispanic Television Network (HTVN)/Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation, which incidentally filed for bankruptcy⁶⁴ and is now being acquired by Univision, owns at least 13 stations and operates in approximately 17 markets but receives less than 1% of the primetime Hispanic audience.⁶⁵ Mexico-based TV Azteca is another rapidly expanding Spanish-language television group in the U.S. It recently added a New York City affiliate to its existing 17 affiliated stations across the U.S. Azteca America's programming, which includes content primarily produced in Mexico, reaches 53% of the Hispanic households in the U.S.⁶⁶

While these networks, their affiliates, and a limited number of independent television stations reach millions of viewers on a daily basis, advertising revenue accounts for less than 2% of all advertising spending in the United States. Nevertheless, revenues are surging past \$1 billion annually, and they continue to grow as the market of Hispanic consumers multiplies.⁶⁷

It is understandable that presidential campaigns in close elections will focus energy and money on reaching the audience of these networks.⁶⁸ Strong broadcasting signals from affiliates reach the nation's largest Hispanic populations via local stations in key Electoral College states: New Mexico (42.1% Hispanic), California (32.4%), Texas (32%), Arizona (25.3%), Nevada (19.7%), Colorado (17.1%), Florida (16.8%), New York (15.1%), and Illinois (12.3%) (see Appendix IV). According to Univision, these nine states have over 16 million Hispanic adults, accounting for more than 80% of the total Hispanic population in the United States.⁶⁹ These states are home to the 16 local media markets with the most significant Hispanic populations: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Dallas, Houston, Miami, Phoenix, Sacramento, San Diego, San Antonio, Albuquerque, Fresno, El Paso, Harlingen, and Corpus Christi.⁷⁰

While millions of Hispanic voters receive and regularly tune into English networks, this study is primarily devoted to examining the political Spanish-language and bilingual television advertising campaign efforts by the parties and candidates. It is nearly impossible to gauge the level of English advertising aimed at English-speaking Hispanic voters, especially when ad buying decisions can be based on market share.

RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY

The research process involved gathering and analyzing information from three main sources of information: the campaigns and the parties, the Spanish-language television networks and stations, and an independent academic organization that tracks campaign television advertising with the help of a new business and innovative technology.

Interviews with the leading consultants, ad makers, and campaign communications and constituency outreach staff complemented the data obtained from the stations and academic source and help create a record of the campaign structures and strategies behind efforts to reach Hispanic voters. For the Bush campaign and the RNC, interviews were conducted with Lionel Sosa, Bush campaign media consultant; Frank Guerra, RNC media consultant; Leslie Sanchez, former RNC Deputy Communications Director and current Bush political appointee at the U.S. Department of Education; and Leonard Rodriguez, Bush campaign staffer and current White House Political Office staffer. For the Gore campaign and the DNC, interviews were conducted with Carter Eskew, Chief Strategist for Gore 2000; Armando Gutierrez, DNC media consultant; Bill Knapp, Gore campaign media consultant; Janet Murguia, Gore campaign Deputy Campaign Manager and Constituency Outreach Director; and Jim Learned and Pablo Izquierdo, former EMM Creative account executives and Gore media consultants.⁷¹

Each professional was asked a set of questions to determine how many Spanish-language television ads were created, where they were placed and when, their cost, strategy behind the ads, and the perceived impact each ad had upon the candidates' shares of the Hispanic vote. While some of these variables have ordinal or interval measures, others have nominal measures and are more subjective. The purpose of including this nominal information is to add further insight into the campaign process and provide a deeper understanding of the campaign strategies and political dynamics behind the advertising. As two full years have lapsed since the 2000 campaign concluded, interview subjects lack some of the details necessary to create a comprehensive account of spending on advertising. Interview subjects were asked to locate their records from the 2000 campaign. None of the individuals were able to share files, but all spoke openly about every aspect of their work and assisted in gathering data for this project.

Through an agreement with the Wisconsin Advertising Project at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the leading national, academic program studying political campaign television advertising spending, the most comprehensive independent raw data of 2000 campaign spending on Hispanic television was obtained for this study. The Wisconsin Advertising Project has a long-term agreement with a new private corporate vendor, the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG), to supply raw information which was used in preparation of this data. A database of each ad run on the leading Spanish-language television networks, affiliates, and cable channels was created using the Wisconsin Advertising Project/CMAG data. It includes the ads' sponsors, assigned title, channel/network/affiliate on which the ads aired, market, and estimated cost. All analysis of the data for this project was provided by the author or interview subjects.

CMAG, a commercial firm based in Alexandria, Virginia that advises advertisers, campaigns, and reporters, compiled extensive data on campaign advertising from the 2000

presidential election. CMAG gathered the data using innovative technology that monitored political advertising by the major national broadcast television networks and affiliates and 25 leading cable networks in the 75 leading media markets reaching over 80% of the American population. Each time an ad ran during the 2000 campaign, CMAG recorded the date, time, television station and length of the ad. The information was later supplemented with estimates of the cost for each time slot. CMAG reported the average cost of the time slot for each ad aired. This captured the cost of the media buy, not the amount spent on production or placement.⁷²

A few obstacles were encountered in the course of the research. Due to uniquely defined methodology, some of the data obtained from the University of Wisconsin/CMAG research on spending on local Univision and Telemundo affiliates were incomplete. The problems stem from two main complications. First, CMAG did not pursue data from any of the television markets beyond the top 75 market plan. As a result, CMAG did not have any data from some markets critical to this research, such as Orlando and Tampa. Second, some advertising data corresponding to candidates and parties in the top 75 markets was not supplied to CMAG.

According to a report by Yale University political scientist Jonathan Krasno and University of Wisconsin-Madison political scientist Kenneth Goldstein, political campaigns have approximately 1300 major television stations in the nation's 210 media markets to choose from. While the campaigns often focus exclusively on the top 100 markets, the CMAG data often does not include smaller, more minor media markets.⁷³ Therefore, it was important to supplement the CMAG data with other research that would fill in gaps from the first stage of the research and to confirm estimates.

Requests for spending data by the presidential candidates and their parties were filed with the Univision and Telemundo networks and with stations in Florida, New Mexico, Nevada, Wisconsin and other important states. This effort yielded critical data that has been compared with the CMAG data to develop the most comprehensive independent analysis ever done of spending on Spanish-language television advertising during the 2000 campaign (see Appendix I).

By using a database of Spanish-language stations created by QRS Newmedia, a Washington-based media production firm that created the Gore campaign's database of all major media organizations in the nation, it was possible to verify that each of the nation's leading Spanish-language stations that were on the air in 2000 in the top 75 markets were included in this study.

CHAPTER I: CAMPAIGN AND PARTY STRUCTURES

The Bush and Gore campaigns established unique campaign structures to focus on differing priorities for reaching the nation's Hispanic voters. While both campaigns sought to earn the vote of Hispanic Americans in all fifty states, the campaigns devised costly targeted strategies only in a handful of battleground states where large Hispanic communities could make the difference. While the campaigns spent large amounts of money (record amounts in some markets and states) on Spanish-language television advertising, their efforts were only limited portions of broader national television advertising barrages.

The Campaigns

Bush's team, headed by strategist Karl Rove, made the campaign's Spanish-language media plan a top priority both in public and private strategy sessions. Rove had been an adviser to Bush during his two Texas gubernatorial campaigns and had seen the positive ways Hispanic voters reacted to his candidacy for Governor. In his 1999 re-election campaign, Governor Bush received nearly 50% of the Hispanic vote in his state.⁷⁴ According to veteran Republican advertising consultant Lionel Sosa, Karl Rove was at the top of the chain of command of the 2000 campaign's Hispanic strategy and was joined by senior Democratic advertising veteran and Bush adviser Mark McKinnon. "[Rove] is a numbers man, very aware of the growing Hispanic influence in politics, it's right here in his own backyard," said Sosa. "Kind of the way Clinton understands blacks and understands the importance. Karl is the exact same way. It was important even in Iowa. We were there working two months before the straw poll finding every Hispanic we could in Iowa."⁷⁵

Rove sought to replicate Bush's Texas playbook in Hispanic communities on a national level. He hired a veteran, all-star team experienced at reaching Hispanic voters on behalf of both Republican and Democratic candidates. Two different advertising agencies were established to ensure that both the Bush campaign (Maverick Media) and the RNC (Victory 2000) were prepared to reach the nation's voters. Following the loose guidelines of the campaign finance laws at the time, each of these agencies was independently funded.

Sosa was officially integrated into the Bush campaign's Maverick Media group. He was joined by former Democratic strategist McKinnon, San Antonio-based ad-maker Luis Garcia, Bush pollster Matt Dowd, consultant Stuart Stevens, and Kathy Sosa (Sosa's wife, and herself an accomplished Hispanic strategist). Lionel Sosa and the rest of the team were in direct communication with Rove throughout the campaign. The campaign team concentrated its Spanish-language advertising strategy during the general election on winning New Mexico, Florida, and Colorado, according to Sosa.⁷⁶

In contrast, the Gore campaign's top strategists and campaign professionals made outreach to Hispanics a different priority, one on a list with other constituencies that the campaign planned to target in battleground states.

With shifting power at the top level of Democratic leadership, and a changing list of

campaign managers and media consultants, responsibility for the Hispanic strategy often fell to the political consultants. It was up to them to develop the campaign's Spanish-language ads. The campaign assigned a Deputy Campaign Manager, Janet Murguia, the responsibility of developing the campaign's strategy to reach Hispanics. It was clearly not treated as the same level of priority as it was in the Bush campaign structure with Rove at the helm. As a result, it was never clear who, above the level of Deputy Campaign Manager, was responsible for the Gore campaign's Hispanic strategy and who saw it as a top priority. The candidates' backgrounds contributed to this structural difference. Gore, himself, never had to make Hispanic outreach a critical role in his campaigns for the U.S. Senate in Tennessee. And while he had run two national campaigns as candidate for Vice President, there is little evidence to indicate Gore was ever closely involved with the Clinton-Gore Hispanic strategy in 1992 or 1996.

Pablo Izquierdo, who created a number of the Gore campaign's Spanish-language ads, said that Murguia "was our only public face" within the campaign. She "was our liaison, our point of contact, everything we did ran through her, she channeled all the issues to whoever needed to see them or approve."⁷⁷

The Gore campaign was top-heavy with Democratic advertising executives. Chief Strategist Carter Eskew, a legendary ad-maker, oversaw all advertising operations from within the campaign headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee. Eskew brought in presidential campaign veterans Harrison Hickman and Bill Knapp to work with him to produce the majority of the campaign's ads. It was Knapp who solicited two primary vendors for the campaign's Spanish-language advertising efforts. Knapp essentially reported to Eskew, Hickman, and Bob Shrum, the campaign's top consultants who spent a great deal of time in Nashville. Campaign Manager Donna Brazile (who was previously the campaign's Political Director) was more involved with budgeting where the campaign would spend ads but was less involved with the ad messages, according to Knapp.⁷⁸

"I was in charge of making sure that the DNC and Gore ads were strategically and tactically what we wanted," said Knapp. Knapp hired EMM Creative, a firm that specialized in advertising to Hispanic consumers, to work for the campaign. EMM Creative's Jim Learned oversaw the strategy for the client, and Pablo Izquierdo was the account supervisor. They worked directly and primarily with Knapp. The EMM team came to the campaign after offering their services to Knapp's firm, Squier, Knapp, Dunn, a company that they had previously worked with. Despite having no prior political expertise they were hired following the Democratic National Convention. They were assigned to work with Knapp who was intrigued by their proposed strategy to use consumer advertising techniques rather than political advertising styles. Based in Bethesda, Maryland, the firm's principals made the short commute to Washington, DC often to meet with Knapp at his firm's Capitol Hill office, but did not spend time in Nashville.⁷⁹

"We had Armando [Gutierrez] who was doing the DNC stuff and I just felt I had known the EMM folks over the years," said Knapp. "The Republicans were doing some intriguing, gauzy ads for Bush." So he decided it was time for Democrats to create some ads that were "not fact laden, more emotional" and complemented the issue-based advertising Gutierrez was creating for the DNC.⁸⁰

EMM Creative produced the bulk of the Gore campaign's Spanish-language

advertisements. According to Learned, the firm filmed three Gore television ads and four or five radio spots. Learned said that the campaign used the radio ads to supplement efforts to reach Hispanics in battleground areas where there were no major Spanish-language television stations, such as Milwaukee, Wisconsin.⁸¹

The Parties

RNC Chairman Jim Nicholson, Chief of Staff Tom Cole, and Deputy Press Secretary Leslie Sanchez were the top Party staff responsible for the organization's paid Spanish-language advertising and earned media strategies. Sanchez assembled a group of the Republican Party's top Spanish-language ad consultants to advise the RNC on its Hispanic strategy and to produce the organization's ads. Her "brain trust," as she calls it, included Lionel and Kathy Sosa, ad-maker Frank Guerra, pollster Lance Terrance, former California Republican Party political director Mike Madrid, Nicholson and Cole.⁸² According to Sosa, the RNC created its own "strategy of where it is they wanted their message to be." However, it is clear that virtually all of the same people that were advising the RNC on its communications strategy were advising the Bush campaign on its efforts. The RNC focused funds on ad buys in California, Florida, and New Mexico.⁸³

Armando Gutierrez, a long-time Democratic operative and presidential campaign veteran, was hired to produce each of the DNC's Spanish-language spots. He also produced some of the Gore campaign's early spots. The DNC's chairman at the time, Joe Andrew, was not as involved with the Party's Spanish-language television efforts as his counterparts at the RNC.⁸⁴

CHAPTER II: PRIORITIES, STRATEGIES, ADS

Painful Decisions in the Battle Over Priorities

The entire team of top-level Hispanic media advisers to the Gore campaign and the DNC believed that the Gore campaign did not put a high enough priority on the Hispanic campaign, according to interviews with staff members and consultants. While at face-value this would appear to be an obvious mistake, the Democratic Party's history and structure shed light on why this occurred. The history of party outreach efforts points to a tug-of-war among the leaders of constituent voting groups for the candidates' time and makes decision-making on funding allocations more difficult.

Janet Murguia, who was in charge of Gore's constituency efforts, was at the center of this trade-off and tricky balancing act. Religious, ethnic, and racial groups of constituents all fought for equal time from Gore. Through a series of meetings with constituency group leaders throughout the campaign, top Gore officials sought to keep these groups from creating public grievances with the campaign. The campaign's top staffers met regularly with groups of Hispanic Americans, African Americans, Asian Americans, Disabled Americans, Jewish Americans, Irish Americans, Gay and Lesbian Americans, and many others. "I knew how painful and difficult it was to make the budgeting decisions and choose among constituencies in targeted states. There are strategic decisions that could be made, and we were trying to do that," Murguia said. "We just didn't have the overall funding budget resources that the Republicans had. We have been strategic in targeted states."⁸⁵

Balancing Gore's time among the constituencies may have avoided public embarrassments, but came at a high price. "I don't think the V.P. spent any more time with Hispanics as opposed to Blacks and seniors," said Murguia. "On the other hand the Republicans were making a strategic decision to single out Hispanics over other constituencies. We needed to cover our base, not an either-or approach. They made a strategic, concerted decision that Hispanics are going to be part of their base. Obviously we have a multi-base party. It's a lot harder in the Democratic Party to make those decisions," she said. Murguia suggests that the Party will have to take a closer look at priorities, learn from 2000, and make the difficult decisions about spending in future campaigns.⁸⁶

While none of the Bush campaign's interview subjects stated any regrets about the priority placed on Hispanic outreach and advertising, some noted ongoing GOP debates over how hard candidates and the Party should reach out to African American voters. With increasing amounts of RNC spending going toward Hispanic outreach, the staffers responsible for the African American outreach desk at the Party headquarters have been vocal about the dangers of neglecting the African American community.⁸⁷

Time with the Candidate

The significant amount of time Bush scheduled for Hispanic events and for production of his Spanish-language television advertisements speaks volumes about the priority he and his

campaign placed on earning record levels of Hispanic votes in the battleground states. Lionel Sosa and his colleagues had access to the candidate whenever they agreed it was necessary.⁸⁸

Gore staffers and media consultants complained about the small amount of time the senior campaign management and the candidate devoted to filming Spanish-language television advertisements. “Access was really a key difference in terms of the candidate’s time. From a practical reality, and decisions that were made much more above me...Bush would personally tell his people to double the money. They had access on different events that they cleared for him,” said Murguia. “[Sosa] got a lot of Bush’s time; they got cameras at two of Bush’s events, worked collaboratively with the RNC. They really were dominant throughout the Bush campaign.” She said the difference in approach came down to “added luxury or strategic priority.”⁸⁹ Her sentiments were echoed in an interview with Gutierrez and her analysis was confirmed in an interview with Sosa.

Despite her criticisms of the small amount of time Gore devoted to filming Spanish-language television spots, Murguia noted that the Gore campaign team was always at a disadvantage as a result of Gore’s need to fulfill his duties as Vice President of the United States.⁹⁰ Gore had many more obligations and restrictions than then-Governor Bush and was often unable, or unwilling, to free himself of these restrictions when his Hispanic consultants requested more of his time.

Nonetheless, Knapp noted that Gore was actively involved with the Spanish-language advertisements in the early stages of the campaign. “At the very first ad we had [Gore] speak Spanish and I think that’s the one and only time. It was not well received,” Knapp explained. “His Spanish wasn’t very good, and it was the consensus of the team” not to do more with Gore speaking Spanish directly to the camera. Knapp said that Gore was “very uninvolved with the ads” after that point but that he often viewed them before they ran.⁹¹

On-Screen Spanish

Bill Knapp said Gore filmed one big shoot early in the campaign with California Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante and Gloria Molina, a member of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and a DNC Vice Chair, at a time when the campaign believed it needed to do more to solidify a victory in California. The ad tested poorly in focus groups, according to Knapp, and Gore’s Spanish sounded poor.⁹²

Gore and Bush received some criticism for their poor Spanish speaking skills. A columnist with the *Houston Chronicle* berated both candidates for their Spanish accents but recognized the points it was scoring them within the Hispanic community during the election.

“Al Gore speaks his scripted Spanish haltingly, with an accent so heavy that hearing him speak the language just might be funnier than listening to Pepe Le Pew speak English. But no matter how humorous and tortured the Vice President’s attempts at Spanish may sound, few Hispanics are snickering. George W. Bush greets Latino crowds with a firm handshake and an imperfect Spanish sprinkled with words in English. If the Texas Governor’s Spanish sometimes leaves onlookers more confused than enlightened, none

complains. By all accounts, Gore's Spanish is much worse. His campaign has spread the word that he is relearning the language he first picked up during a high school summer spent in Mexico. But the Vice President clearly does not remember much. With a few unscripted exceptions, his use of Spanish is limited to a couple of oft-repeated phrases, and even those he mispronounces badly."⁹³

Consumer v. Issue Advertising

Interviews with Gore campaign staffers and consultants highlight the division among the key players within the DNC, the Gore campaign, and their Hispanic advisory groups over the type of Spanish-language or bilingual advertising used to support Gore. Discussions centered on whether the "old-style" of issue advertising could reach Hispanic voters as well as the newer, more progressive style that was being proposed by EMM Creative and was being employed by the Bush campaign. "We felt we needed to treat this like advertising, needed to be aesthetically appealing, as well as message friendly, content friendly. We needed to make sure that the politician didn't come across as the lofty figure, rather as likeable," Izquierdo said.⁹⁴

In the end the DNC spent its money on Gutierrez's issue ads with effectiveness and the Gore campaign mixed its ads. According to Murguia, "On the Gore ads we tried to make a more polished, broader appeal to Hispanics. More of the old style in the Armando ads, hard-core direct appeal." It was "broader marketing appeal versus hardcore political," she said. Murguia said the team decided to do more on the DNC front than with the Gore creative ads. "I felt that with a targeted way we could use the EMM stuff," said Murguia. "It's important for us to start somewhere. We needed to have more than just the old-style political approach, I wanted to put that marker down, and move the Democratic Party into a more progressive approach on that front." With limited resources, Murguia said the team saw it as a "luxury to be strategic and differentiate" from the old-style approach.⁹⁵

"We felt that because it was supposed to be the first major political outreach to the Latino voter nationally, we felt that the usual political track of negative campaigning and issues oriented ads would not work," said Izquierdo. "There is a cultural rejection of negative campaigning in the Latino culture and we felt that the Party's as-usual ads would not work and would backfire and work against the attacker. With the issue ads we felt they were too arcane for the Latino voter." Nevertheless, Izquierdo explained that when advertising to Latinos a focus on specific issues is critical,

"The issues need to be different, more basic. The main worries of the community are education, health, even immigration issues. How do you take care of your kids when both parents are working and perhaps are not even making the minimum? How do you take care of your health when you have no health insurance? Take a step back and say you need health care period (as opposed to universal health/HMOs) we decided we needed to address the bare-bottom issues that people care about."⁹⁶

The Gore campaign's polling told them that Hispanics were primarily concerned with health care and education,⁹⁷ and these issues were featured prominently in the Spanish-language ads.

Bush and RNC Ads

The Bush campaign employed a bilingual approach to reaching Hispanic voters, with Bush and his surrogates speaking Spanish in ads that were both predominantly Spanish and English. According to Sosa, the campaign's media consultants created thirteen ads but only nine were aired.

On June 10 and 11, 2000 the Bush campaign aired two advertisements in the New York market featuring Bush's nephew George P. Bush on the occasion of the annual Puerto Rican Day Parade. Both ads, "Same as Mine" and "How About You", were produced by media consultant Luis Garcia's firm Garcia LKS. These ads featured Bush's nephew George P. Bush speaking directly to the camera in Spanish or English. In the first ad, George P. said in Spanish, "I'm a young Latino in the U.S. and very proud of my bloodline. In many ways, I am like any other American. I believe in opportunity, a level playing field for everyone, and the achievement of the American dream. I have an uncle that is running for president because he believes in the same thing: opportunity for every American, for every Latino. His name – the same as mine, George Bush."⁹⁸

In "How About You" the Bush campaign used both English and Spanish. On-screen, George P. Bush said, "Why vote for George W. Bush? Because he believes in family. Because he supports education. Because he knows we all are the new face of America. Because he wants no child to be left behind. Because it's time for a change. Because he understands our culture. Porque sabe que somos el futuro. Because he's a great guy. Porque el sueño Americano es para todos. Porque él será un gran presidente. This is the reason – esta es el razón – why I'll vote for him. How about you? How about you? ¿Y tu? How about you?"⁹⁹

During the final month of the election, the Bush campaign's Maverick Media team began airing an ad titled "America the Beautiful." Both English and Spanish versions of the ad were created. In the English version, Bush took a very personal approach, speaking directly to the camera during the entire thirty-second commercial. A smiling Bush said that, "Where I come from, cultural diversity isn't just something you read about, it's something you see everyday. In my case it's family. I'm proud of the Latino blood that flows in the Bush family. Latinos contribute so much. In return they deserve to enjoy a full promise of American life, with reforms that say, this is your country, this is your home. El sueño Americano es para ti." A male announcer read a voice-over of nearly identical text as in the English version, and the same visuals, including footage of George P. Bush shaking hands with a crowd of people, are shown on-screen. The spot was paid for by Bush-Cheney 2000, Inc. and the Republican National Committee.¹⁰⁰

Maverick Media created another English spot aimed at Hispanic voters titled "Education." The spot was paid for by Bush-Cheney 2000, Inc. and the Republican National Committee. A male announcer began the ad by saying, "One out of five children born in this country is Latino. Their education will not only define their future, but the future of our nation. George W. Bush knows that an education will bring opportunity. He wants each child to read well, that parents can choose the best school for their children, and that schools are held

responsible for their performance.” Bush closed the ad saying, “To me, education is a first priority. Our children deserve only the best.”¹⁰¹

Among the other ads that were created, the RNC aired three unique Spanish-language television spots. In “El Sueno Americano es Para Todos” (The American Dream is for Everyone) the theme was “Es Un Nuevo Dias” (It is a New Day). In the ad Bush said in Spanish, “The American dream is for everyone that lives in this country.” Visuals included a large Hispanic crowd cheering as Bush addressed the audience in Spanish, video footage of Bush shown kissing a young Hispanic girl, and Laura Bush joining the candidate in shaking hands with a crowd of Hispanic children and adults.¹⁰²

In “Nuestros Hijos” (Our Children), the RNC chose grainy black and white images to begin an ad that attacked the status quo (though not specifically mentioning Gore or the Democrats) for not helping Latinos. As the announcer shifted to discuss a positive future, the ad shifted and color images of Hispanics were shown. A female announcer said in Spanish, “They say that the economy’s better than ever, but in our neighborhoods we feel forgotten. We need education. And that means a new commitment. In Texas, Governor Bush raised academic standards and teachers’ salaries. Test scores improved. Now minority children in Texas lead the country in academic improvement. That’s real accountability.” Bush closed the ad saying, “For me, education is number one. Because our children deserve the best.” The ad was produced by Guerra, DeBerry and Company, funded by the RNC, and was aired during the final month of the campaign.¹⁰³

In “Para Sentirse Mejor” (To Feel Better), the RNC sought to appeal to female Hispanic voters. An older female actress, cast as a grandmother, discussed Bush’s prescription drug plan for senior citizens in Spanish. Bush closed the ad on-screen in Spanish saying, “It’s something for your future, because the American dream is for everyone.” The ad was aired during the final month of the campaign. It was produced by Cold Harbor Films/National Media, an advertising agency in Alexandria, Virginia that created the legendary “Flo” commercials for Citizens for Better Medicare and was part of the RNC’s Victory 2000 team. It was paid for by the RNC.¹⁰⁴

Gore and DNC Ads

Gore’s first Spanish-language television ad, “Su Voto,” was aired during the day leading up to the March 7 primaries in New York and California. Gore spoke Spanish throughout the thirty-second spot, on-camera and with a voice-over, while colorful visuals and text corresponding to the issues he discussed were shown. Gore used the ad to introduce himself to voters, saying in Spanish, “During this campaign, I will be talking to you about many important issues. Better schools, protecting Medicare and providing coverage for prescription drugs, the fight against crime, how to keep our dreams for a better future. Together there is much that we can achieve. Thank you.” The ad was produced by Armando Gutierrez & Associates, Inc. and was paid for by the Gore campaign.¹⁰⁵ An alternative version of the ad included the following ending, “... how to keep guns out of our schools and neighborhoods. Help me realize our dreams for a better future. Together there is much that we can achieve. Thank you.”¹⁰⁶ Gore also ran an

effective Spanish-language television ad devoted to education in the California primary. The primary ads were placed in the expensive Los Angeles and San Francisco media markets.¹⁰⁷

Under the direction of the DNC's Democratic Victory 2000 group, comprised of Squier Knapp Dunn, Shrum Devine Donilon and Carter Eskew, Armando Gutierrez & Associates, Inc. developed Gore's "Issues" or "Al Gore y los Demócratas" spot. In the ad an announcer said in Spanish, "Al Gore and the Democrats: We can count on them." On screen, sitting in a lighted room, Gore faced the camera and calmly said in Spanish, "I'll fight to protect Social Security and Medicare. Extend health care coverage to our children – let's do it. World class public schools for our children. They deserve it. Dreams: Together, we can realize our dreams for our families." As Gore spoke in the ad, video clips showed him speaking before a Hispanic audience, walking with a doctor and a nurse, and holding a baby.¹⁰⁸

EMM Creative produced three ads for the Gore campaign. The ads were all very similar in the text and images used. While the National Anthem played on a Spanish guitar in the background, in "Rostros de Norte America" (Faces of North America), a diverse group of female and male actors each recited sentence fragments in Spanish that were tied together to create an ad flowing with images of different Hispanic Americans sending one message to other Hispanic voters: "We have come so far," said a female executive. "But there is more to accomplish," (male doctor). "Things to learn" (male college student). "In the last eight years, record Hispanic employment" (on screen text). "I am improving every day" (carpenter). "But I have needs" (housewife). "I want more opportunities" (female hotel worker). "Making college more affordable" (on screen text). "I want to feel secure in life (retired mechanic). "What will the future hold for my children?" (mother). "I am America" (school children). "I'm on the right track" (male college graduate). "But I can do better" (male plumber). "That is why I'm voting for Gore" (mother).¹⁰⁹ "That was our image ad that was presenting the candidate as a person and as a solution to what the country needs," noted Izquierdo who said the ads were aired on Univision and Telemundo stations in each of the battleground states with large Hispanic populations.¹¹⁰

With two additional similar spots, EMM Creative produced ads that discussed more campaign issues. This was a response to criticism that the first ad was almost entirely a consumer-style commercial and was not focused enough on Gore's campaign platform issues. In "I Want...I" on-screen text mentions Social Security, reducing taxes, reducing class size, and more teachers, while "I Want...II" mentioned taking on pharmaceutical companies, a Medicare prescription drug plan, universal pre-school, and tax deductions for college.¹¹¹ According to Izquierdo, EMM Creative produced "I Want...I" and "I Want...II" radio versions. "The TV spots were 30 seconds long, the radio ads were 60 seconds long so there was double the content for radio," he explained.¹¹²

DNC Negative Ads

In addition to a number of positive spots, the DNC's Spanish-language television ad campaign involved a series of negative ads, created by Armando Gutierrez, that were used to attack Bush's record as Texas Governor. The DNC created and ran more negative spots than in previous elections as a result of the large spending the Bush campaign was doing on Spanish-

language television and the strong appeal he was making for Hispanic support. According to Gutierrez, the DNC's negative ads tested extremely well during focus groups that were conducted in Tampa, Los Angeles, and Albuquerque.¹¹³ Bill Knapp called one of the negative Spanish-language ads "one of our most effective attack ads" during the campaign. The ad was created by Armando Gutierrez who went into Texas to interview Latinos in Texas who were living in squalor. The ads were run heavily in New Mexico with great success.¹¹⁴ The Bush campaign did not air any independent negative ads in Spanish against Gore, according to Sosa and Guerra.¹¹⁵

The DNC aired "Ninos" (Children) three to four weeks out from the November election. The thirty-second television ad, which was also created as a radio and print ad, focused on the issue of children's health insurance and attacked Bush's record of support for the issue in Texas. In the ad an announcer said in Spanish, "Children. Our pride, our future, our sacred responsibility. George W. Bush opposed the expansion of health care for two hundred twenty thousand more children. A federal judge declared that Texas does not provide adequate health care. Ignoring the needs of the children, Bush has his Attorney General fighting the case. The Bush Plan: if he turns his back on Texas' children, what will he do to the rest of our children?"¹¹⁶

Gutierrez filmed four different thirty-second versions of another negative ad, "Hablan los Tejanos" (Texans Speak). The ads, which were aired during the final week of the campaign in each of the battleground states with large Hispanic populations, featured "average" Hispanic men and woman on the street criticizing Bush's record in Texas.¹¹⁷

In the closing days of the campaign the DNC placed another Gutierrez ad, "Word Association," on the Telemundo network nationally. The ad featured Latino drumbeat music and a series of slides with text comparing Democrats and Republicans. Two of the slides said "Democrata: Latino, Republican: Intolerante" and "Democrata: Hispano, Republican: anti-immigrante." The ad urged viewers to "Vote Democrata." The ad ran on the final Saturday, Sunday and Monday – November 4-6, 2000 – and was intended to support Hispanic get-out-the-vote efforts nationally.¹¹⁸

CHAPTER III: SPENDING IN THE BATTLEGROUND STATES

Both campaigns spent the majority of their Spanish-language television advertising dollars in the same few targeted states and often the exact same markets within those states. A few exceptions existed and may have contributed to the final outcome of the election. The efforts began early in the primaries and continued through Election Day.

This report provides original data and interviews that help identify the actual amounts of money each campaign spent to reach Hispanic voters through Spanish-language television advertising (see Appendix I). With data compiled from interviews with campaign staff, television networks and stations, and raw data from the top 75 markets across the nation, it is possible to verify or challenge the claims made by the campaigns in media reports and press releases during the election and in recent interviews.

Data compiled for this project finds that the Bush campaign spent at least \$810,000 on Spanish-language television ads during the 2000 campaign. The RNC and affiliated groups spent at least \$1.5 million nationally in support of Bush on Spanish-language television ads. The Gore campaign spent at least \$490,000 on Spanish-language ads nationally. The DNC spent at least \$475,000 nationally. As a result, the Bush campaign and the RNC outspent the Gore campaign and the DNC by more than a 2-1 margin on Spanish-language television stations nationally.¹¹⁹

Bill Knapp estimated that both the Gore campaign and the DNC spent around \$1.5 million combined on Spanish-language television advertisements. Murguia, frustrated with the funding disparities between the campaigns said, “I bet the Bush folks spent \$2.5 million easy, the threat was \$10 million, and we are usually outspent 3-1 by the Republicans.” Murguia and Learned both estimated that the Gore campaign spent about \$500,000 on its Spanish-language television ads. “We were scratching and crawling to get \$500,000,” Murguia said.¹²⁰

The only special interest group or third party organization that aired a significant amount of Spanish-language television ads during the presidential campaign was the Sierra Club. The environmental organization assisted the Gore campaign’s Spanish-language television strategy by airing tens of thousands of dollars in negative ads attacking Bush. The ads were produced by Haddow Communications and totaled more than \$270,000. They ran in Los Angeles (\$64,000), Miami (\$44,000), Orlando (\$50,000), Albuquerque (\$77,000), Denver (\$24,000), and Chicago (\$12,000). In one of the spots, “Ignore,” viewers were told, “As governor, George W. Bush ignored the air pollution problems in Texas.”¹²¹

Primaries

Both candidates used Spanish-language television and radio commercials during the 2000 primaries. Gore ran his early Spanish-language television ads in New York (\$90,000) and California (\$190,000). “We knew that was going to be the only time we were going to run those, for GOTV [get-out-the-vote] purposes. They were strong-hold states,” said Murguia.¹²² Gore’s primary opponent, Bill Bradley, was the only other major party presidential candidate to air Spanish-language television ads in the primaries. Bradley spent \$73,000 on the Univision and

Telemundo stations in Los Angeles. The impact of these ads was limited, and Gore trounced Bradley among Hispanics in the California Democratic primary. Gore won statewide 80%-20%.¹²³ Gore won the New York Democratic primary 66%-33%.¹²⁴

Bush ran his first Spanish-language ads in Iowa (first *radio* ad – data spending not available) and Arizona (first *television* ad – at least \$42,000 in Phoenix on the local Univision station). Bush launched his primary and caucus campaign's paid media efforts in October 1999.

For the Iowa Caucus, the campaign created a sixty-second Spanish-language radio ad that said, "Once again, the spotlight is on Iowa. And for the first time it's shining on the Latino community. We're voters too, and George W. Bush believes that all Iowans should help elect a President. In this presidential election you will see a fresh start, the beginning of a new day for Latinos."¹²⁵ The ad was produced by Lionel and Kathy Sosa.¹²⁶

The television advertising process began in early 2000 when the Bush campaign became the first to air a Spanish-language television advertisement in the Arizona presidential primary. At the time, Bush was in a potentially close race against Arizona Senator John McCain who had soundly defeated him in the New Hampshire Republican primary.¹²⁷

Florida General Election

With a rising statewide Hispanic population, among the largest in the nation, Florida is at the center of the demographic shift taking place nationally. With a Hispanic community of more than 2,750,000 people, accounting for at least 17 percent of the state's population, Hispanic citizens play a critical role in the state's political process.¹²⁸

During the campaign, Knapp and other Gore advisers argued that spending large sums on television in Miami to influence Cuban voters was "wildly inefficient" especially in a state that is "terribly expensive." Knapp said the campaign made the decision to spend heavily in the Orlando and Tampa markets which had larger populations of more sympathetic Hispanic voters. The Bush campaign employed a different strategy.

Miami/Ft. Lauderdale

The Gore campaign all but conceded the Miami Hispanic vote to Bush, a departure from the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign. Some of Gore's Hispanic advertising consultants called this choice a fateful decision. Bush and the Republican Party actively courted the community throughout the election, spending an astonishing \$785,000 on television there (see Appendix I). Spending in Miami was more than ten times the rate spent by the Bush campaign and the RNC in Orlando or Tampa. Their expanded efforts to court this community were rewarded by their success in 2000.¹²⁹

Republicans never took the Cuban vote for granted. Sanchez noted that past electoral voting histories in Miami's predominantly-Cuban population had created a strong Republican base and set political precedence. Sanchez explained that demographers and pollsters indicated that Hispanic voters were quickly changing the demographic make-up of Florida, and noted that

there is already evidence of new Hispanic demographics in Miami that show a more diverse population that is no longer just Cuban.¹³⁰ Even the Cuban population is changing, according to Sosa. “The Cuban is still, of course, very conservative Republican, but is becoming more independent. Second-generation voters are not necessarily as conservative,” he said.¹³¹

Adam Nagourney, a political writer for *The New York Times*, noted in 1999 that, “Generational differences in the views of ethnic groups are also emerging. The single burning issue of one generation of immigrants, which made them vulnerable to easy appeals by politicians, has become merely one of many concerns for their American children and grandchildren. In Florida, older Cuban-Americans are as passionate in their opposition to Fidel Castro as ever; but that bitterness has not necessarily passed down to the next generation.”¹³²

Frank Guerra, an RNC advertising consultant, explained that the Bush message to Hispanics was not stratified:

“The overall goal was to communicate to Hispanic voters, no matter where they were in Florida, the issues that are important to Hispanics in any community. This was the reverse of Gore. I think what it shows was a lack of commitment to communicate to Hispanics. For a long time the Democratic Party has taken Hispanics for granted. They have just wrongly assumed that all Hispanics are liberal and will tow the Democratic line. I think that what it reflects, what the last 5, 10 election cycles reflect, is a wrong assumption by the Democratic Party that they own the Hispanic vote. I am making that as an absolute judgment about the lack of attention to Hispanics.”¹³³

In a game of priorities the Gore campaign chose not to compete in the expensive Miami media market. “In Miami you do not have the natural constituency,” said Murguia. “It’s tough to turn some of those Cubans around.”¹³⁴

The EMM Creative team strongly disagreed with the Gore campaign’s decision to concede Miami, a judgment that became their core disagreement with the senior campaign strategists. According to Izquierdo,

“They wanted to concede the Miami Latino-Cuban vote because they felt that Miami was majority Cuban and meaning also majority Republican, and they felt that they wanted to also basically concede that market and focus elsewhere in Tampa and Orlando. But we argued that the demographics of Miami had changed, no longer were the Cubans dominant, and within the Cubans themselves, second generation Cubans were not giving Republicans votes and were more moderate. And there were newer populations flowing into Miami from Central and South America that no longer made it a monolithic Cuban market. We won that argument about two weeks away from Election Day, and they let us buy Miami for two weeks, but by then it was too little too late. It was going to be more like a \$50,000 buy, I am guessing here. Twenty-five grand a week would be a significant buy.”¹³⁵

Jim Learned argues that had more money been spent in Florida things could have been different for Gore. “With true 20-20 hindsight, I’m sure it would have made a big difference,” he said. “My sense is the Democrats could have done a lot more. It wouldn’t be done again.” His business colleague is blunter. “It was the key losing factor,” said Izquierdo. “We think that if we

had been stronger in Miami we would have won Florida. We could have picked up those thousand votes very easily.”¹³⁶

It is important to note that most of the Bush campaign’s strategists recognized the shifting political leanings of the Hispanic community in Miami and the rest of the state and identified it as one of the most important aspects of a Republican strategy to win the state. “Miami is only 50% Cuban, whereas eight years ago it was 85% Cuban,” says Sosa. “What has happened is the more liberal Hispanic is having more influence. It’s not the slam dunk it was four years ago...We knew that Florida was the key state. We had hoped to turn New Mexico around as well,” said Sosa. “Florida is where we decided ‘if we are going to spend our money in one place it should be there’.” He claims that Bush received 6,500 more Hispanic votes than Gore in Florida.

Orlando and Tampa

With thriving Hispanic communities, the Orlando and Tampa markets accounted for the bulk of the Gore/DNC spending in Florida and for a significant portion of the Bush/RNC buys. With rapidly growing new immigrant communities in Central and South Florida, these two areas gave the candidates the potential to tap into a new, diverse generation of voters. The two campaigns nearly matched each other dollar for dollar between the two cities. Gore and the DNC spent \$68,000 in Orlando and \$61,000 in Tampa. Bush and the RNC spent \$57,000 in Orlando and \$82,000 in Tampa (see Appendix I).¹³⁷

New Mexico

In the close presidential race in New Mexico, where Gore beat Bush by a razor-thin 366 vote margin (286,783 to 286,417),¹³⁸ the Gore campaign's Hispanic strategy paid off handsomely. The Gore campaign and the DNC outspent the Bush campaign and the RNC \$204,000 to \$73,000 – almost 3 to 1 – on Spanish-language television advertising in the Albuquerque/Santa Fe media markets, the largest in the state. With significant spending by the Sierra Club on ads attacking Bush (\$77,000), Gore’s margin of spending on supportive advertising over Bush reached 4-1.¹³⁹

In addition to the paid media campaigns, both campaigns devoted very significant resources to earned media efforts in the state, arranging interviews for campaign surrogates. During the final stretch of the election the Gore team had surrogates visit the state on a weekly basis. They included virtually all of the Clinton Administration’s cabinet officials, Gore, his running-mate Senator Joe Lieberman, Gore’s daughter Kristen Gore and many others.¹⁴⁰ Henry Cisneros and Murguia conducted live satellite media interviews on Albuquerque English-language television stations KOB (NBC affiliate) and KOAT (ABC affiliate). The campaign and the DNC arranged interviews on Hispanic radio stations across New Mexico for Lieberman and a group of Hispanic Democratic leaders.¹⁴¹ These efforts complemented the Gore campaign’s most significant Spanish-language ad buys outside of the California primary.¹⁴²

Staffers who directed efforts in New Mexico for both candidates explained that the paid and earned media efforts in New Mexico played an important part in all statewide campaign strategies. They noted that unlike every other state in the nation where Hispanics are viewed as a minority constituency group, in New Mexico Hispanics are treated as the majority by the candidates and parties. This means that all outreach efforts are primarily aimed at Hispanic voters. “Your state is over 50% Hispanic. Any way you slice and dice that pie, Hispanics are going to make a difference,” noted Rodriquez.¹⁴³

Bill Knapp praised Armando Gutierrez’s strategy in New Mexico. “I would give him almost total credit for New Mexico,” said Knapp. He explained that in addition to extensive Spanish-language advertising in the state, the Democrats sponsored English ads and media tours that were Hispanic-oriented. Gutierrez is more humble, “I think New Mexico went well. We had some good people working the campaign here. They were very aggressive and we spent a pretty good amount of money here...it was a blue island in a red sea,” he said referring to the GOP victories in neighboring states in the Southwestern U.S.¹⁴⁴

California

Following the major primaries the campaigns and the media began to focus on potential battleground states in the general election. While the media included California in the list of states that were potentially in-play during the general election, the two campaigns had different perspectives on the state’s status. Bush and the RNC poured more than \$10 million worth of television advertising into the state, including more than \$1 million in Spanish-language television spots, only to lose the state by a significant margin (see Appendix I). The Gore campaign did not sponsor any television advertisements in California during the general election, preserving limited resources for close battleground states.¹⁴⁵

Bush campaign strategists argued that it was a responsible decision to spend so much money on ads in California. Frank Guerra, whose firm placed millions of dollars of RNC ads in the state, defended the buys as a down payment on long-term Hispanic support.

Lionel Sosa agreed, “That’s two things.” First, “An investment in the future and a showing of appreciation to the volunteers who worked so hard, poured their hearts out. We needed to show that we wouldn’t leave them hanging in the wings.” Secondly, “A lot of that money was raised in California, to do the job there. They were working hard, and thought they could win, though we knew we couldn’t.” As a result the campaign was compelled to spend a significant amount of California money in California, he argued.¹⁴⁶

Many political analysts continue to question the Bush campaign’s decision to spend millions of dollars in California. Matt Bai, a contributor to *The New York Times Magazine*, recently criticized what he saw as Karl Rove’s miscalculation in California. “He lost the state by 13 points, while other states that really were attainable – New Mexico, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania – ultimately slipped away.”¹⁴⁷

“Bush’s massive spending in California – only Florida and Pennsylvania received more ad dollars – erased his advertising advantage over Gore in other important states,” said Professor

Ken Goldstein. “As a result, the Vice President was able to outspend Governor Bush in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Washington, and in New Mexico, Oregon and Iowa – all states that Bush lost by tiny margins.”¹⁴⁸ While Goldstein argued that the differences were muted by Bush’s campaign victory, it is a reminder that the Bush campaign’s strategy to seek votes in 2000 in California may have been misguided. Sosa still defended the campaign’s decisions and said that he never believed it was possible for the campaigns to win in California. In fairness, the Gore campaign’s chief strategist wasn’t surprised by the Bush campaign’s decision to spend millions of dollars in the state, and noted that the spending was relatively minor when seen as a part of the total Bush campaign spending.¹⁴⁹

Nevada

In Nevada, hoping to repeat Clinton’s 1996 victory which drew significant support from the state’s rapidly growing Hispanic community, the Gore and DNC team outspent the Bush and RNC efforts \$186,000 - \$45,000 on Spanish-language television advertisements statewide.¹⁵⁰

Despite the 4-1 television spending advantage on Spanish-language television, Gore lost the state to Bush by four percent of the vote (see Appendix I). Clinton beat Dole in the state by one percent of the vote in 1996. In the final weeks of the election, the Gore campaign strategists saw just how close the election was going to be and wagered on high spending in Nevada, despite a previous strategy to focus resources elsewhere. *The decision cost Gore in other states; the campaign spent 30% more money on Spanish-language television advertising in Nevada than in Florida.*

George P. the “One-Hit-Wonder”

The Bush campaign’s most successful ad on Spanish-language television in the “bang-for-the-buck” category featured Bush’s nephew, George P. Bush – the son of brother Jeb Bush. “Where we got a lot of media attention were the George P. Bush spots, which ran in New York right before the Puerto Rican Day parade. We spent less than \$10,000 on ads and got a couple of million dollars in earned media,” said campaign media consultant Lionel Sosa, the ads’ producer.¹⁵¹ Later in the campaign, the ads ran only about 100 times in Miami, Los Angeles, and Albuquerque-Santa Fe but continued to draw wide media attention. This later run, funded by the Republican National Committee, cost \$110,000.¹⁵²

“The campaign probably paid for two buys for launch during the Puerto Rican Day Parade on Telemundo for literally \$1,000, if that, and perhaps as low as \$500,” said Leonard Rodriguez. “It ran twice, two buys two times, \$500 for each ad, at midnight, late-night, and was preempted with a pre-event advisory.” Rodriguez estimated that the earned media attention across the country from the launch of the ad was probably worth *two or three million dollars*. As a result of the tremendous and unexpected success of the ads, the campaign decided to use George P. Bush as a major surrogate across the country, a role much expanded from his previous campaign experiences on behalf of his grandfather, President George H. W. Bush, and his father, Florida Governor Jeb Bush. The Bush campaign promoted George P. as a Latino representative of the community’s aspirations. He earned broad Hispanic and Anglo media attention throughout

the campaign, including numerous live television appearances throughout the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia in August and even a cover story in *People* magazine. The wide media attention George P. drew convinced the campaign to send him on the campaign trail into cities and states with large Hispanic populations, including California, New Mexico, and his home state of Florida.¹⁵³

Understanding How to Reach Hispanics

Like many past presidential campaigns, the Gore campaign struggled with how to best communicate with Hispanic voters. Armando Gutierrez was very critical of the Gore campaign's top media strategists. "The Anglo consultants, Bill Knapp, [Carter] Eskew... they came to me and said, 'here you go Armando, go make it work in Spanish.' That is not the way to do effective Hispanic outreach," he explains.¹⁵⁴

"I don't mean any disrespect to either one of them, both are very astute consultants," said Murguia. "I don't think they are alone. There are very few consultants that fundamentally understand how to communicate with the Hispanic population, or fully understand the role of Latinos in elections. They saw it as a box that needs to be checked, then we'll move on to the more important issues, I think they were looking at it this way."¹⁵⁵

Many Anglo political consultants agree that they don't fundamentally understand how to communicate with Hispanics. Were Gore's consultants an exception? "No," says Knapp. "That's one of the reasons I brought on EMM Creative. [Hispanics] are different to communicate to." The Hispanic community is not homogenous, he admits. They are "complex in their own and unique ways, less partisan, more independent..." Knapp was conciliatory, "I don't pretend to understand... but I do know enough to hire people who do."¹⁵⁶

Both Campaigns Win Big with "Hindsight"

Bush and Gore campaign strategists spoke openly about the mistakes they made. Their comments indicate that the 2004 presidential campaign will bring back many of the same battleground state contests and challenges for resource allocation.

"I think we should have spent more money and effort in New Mexico," said Lionel Sosa. "But Florida would not have been the focus," he explains, referring to the tough decisions the campaign had to make about where to spend its money. "I wish more time and money was spent in Colorado," he added.¹⁵⁷

"I'd run more Hispanic media in Florida," said Bill Knapp, who said he plans to sit out 2004. But he was cautious about jumping to criticize the campaign's strategies at the time, "Remember, Gore was vulnerable with Elian Gonzalez. Gore was not beloved with Cuban Americans...I think our strategy was pretty good, a little more Texas-negative in Florida would have picked up some more. In Missouri, we could have run more there." Knapp said that it was a good decision for the campaign to pull out of Colorado early. But, he said he regrets the

campaign pulled out of Ohio early, where the Spanish-language media campaign could have helped make a difference.¹⁵⁸

CONCLUSIONS

The 2000 presidential election confirmed the critical role the nation's rapidly growing Hispanic community now commands in national elections. The contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore is an important milestone in the history of this community's political strength in key battleground states across the nation. Spanish-language television advertising played an important role in the Hispanic outreach strategies of both campaigns, though the Bush campaign made its efforts a higher priority.

Changing demographics of the United States may, one day, alter the status of states that were not battleground sites in the 2000 campaign. Some states, like Colorado, may soon play host to more competitive elections with the state's Hispanic population continuing to rise above 17 percent. States that have long been battlegrounds can be expected to see more targeted and costly efforts to reach the growing Hispanic populations. As the youngest, fastest growing population in the U.S., Hispanics will command greater powers in a growing number of states in future elections.

Campaigns that choose to compete in Florida, New York, and California, will need to spend much more on television advertising and other efforts than in the past. In Pennsylvania, with the Hispanic population accounting for a little more than three percent of the statewide population,¹⁵⁹ both Bush (\$90,000) and Gore (\$60,000) spent part of their limited resources on Spanish-language television advertising in a bid to reach the small Hispanic segment of the electorate (see Appendix I). This demonstrates that presidential campaigns are willing to use significant resources, which could be distributed elsewhere, to draw support from Hispanics in key battleground states. Support from Hispanics may only account for an extra one or two percentage points in some of these states but may represent the margin of victory. For example, Ohio's population is only two percent Hispanic, yet more than 200,000 Hispanic citizens who live in the state may influence the outcome of a close contest in the near future.

As the Hispanic population in America grows there will continue to be significant lag times between when new immigrants become citizens, when new citizens register to vote, and when they become a permanent part of the political process. With candidates, parties, interest groups, and non-profit Hispanic advocacy organizations helping facilitate and improve this process, America will continue to witness the growing political involvement of the Hispanic community for the foreseeable future.

Television Advertising Tone

As interviews with the nation's leading Hispanic political strategists revealed, there is a difference of opinion over whether positive or negative television ads are most effective in influencing the votes of Hispanics.

Republican consultants argued that Spanish-language advertising can be most effective when it focuses on the issues that are most important to the Hispanic community in a positive format. Some of the most moving positive ads created for both campaigns in 2000 had a similar

emphasis on the “American Dream.” For candidates in 2000 this conjured up discussions of educational opportunities and assistance, high quality and inexpensive medical care, and efforts to support the family. It challenged Hispanic voters to become closer to the American political system in a way that reaffirms and fulfills many of their personal hopes and needs.

For focused advertising to be effective, voters need to feel that candidates are closely aligned with Hispanic values, the community, and its leaders. Consequently, both Bush and Gore relied upon endorsements from prominent Hispanic supporters for some of their ads and effective surrogate media placements. The Bush campaign also very effectively trumpeted “the Latino blood that flows in the Bush family.”

The Gore and Bush campaigns relied upon positive biographical and issue advertising to relay their messages to Hispanics. The Gore campaign saw its issue efforts complemented by the negative advertising by the DNC and Sierra Club that attacked Bush.

While Armando Gutierrez and Bill Knapp argued that these ads were most effective, data from the 2002 election suggest that confidence in this method is not universal. Nearly 90 percent of all Spanish-language television ads run in 2002 were positive and only four percent were negative.¹⁶⁰ Strategists identified two factors that help account for the positive nature of television advertisements geared toward Hispanic voters. First, a large percentage of Hispanic voters are first-time voters. Candidates and the parties seek a positive long-term relationship with Hispanic voters. As a result, they make an unusual effort to introduce themselves in positive ways.

Second, many negative advertisements have not tested well in focus groups. While the DNC and Sierra Club effectively used negative Spanish-language television ads in 2000, strategists behind the 2002 ads reported that focus groups determined that Hispanic voters respond poorly to existing styles of negative ads.¹⁶¹

This information highlights the fact that a debate over the tone of Spanish-language political advertising is ongoing.

Television Advertising Styles and Techniques

Another debate is ongoing over which advertising styles and techniques are most effective for reaching Hispanics. It is a debate that is not exclusive to advertising agencies that focus on Hispanic consumers and voters. Consultants agree that there are real differences in how Hispanics and non-Hispanics react to diverse advertising techniques. Spanish-language television programming, reflecting Hispanic culture, is far more energetic than non-Hispanic television programming. This fact contributes to the continuing debate over whether *consumer-style* political advertisements are more effective than the traditional *issue* advertisements candidates have used in the past. Both the Bush and Gore campaigns aired ads during the 2000 campaign that borrowed techniques from consumer advertisers with some success. For example, both campaigns made use of hand-held cameras to capture “unscripted” moments with the candidates.

While a large amount of the Spanish-language television advertisements in 2000 were developed only to reach Hispanic voters, some were simply translations of ads created for

English stations. Strategists working for the parties and candidates commissioned Hispanic media consultants to produce unique ads that would only be aired on Spanish-language television stations. These ad makers understood that Spanish-language television programs viewed by Spanish-speaking Americans are distinct from national television broadcasting for the non-Hispanic audience. Dominant cultural differences are evident when comparing broadcasts and these niche ads developed in 2000. The ads aired in 2000, and more recently in 2002, demonstrate that candidates and their strategists now understand what many corporations have understood for more than a decade: the importance of advertisements specifically created for Hispanic viewers.

Psychologists, sociologists, focus group professionals, and Hispanic television experts could all offer advice to help candidates create television spots that are compatible with Spanish-language television content and will have the greatest impact with Hispanic voters. Media experts understand the value of positive and negative advertising, different color schemes, images, languages, and music, in evoking the reaction among Hispanic voters that will cause them to support particular candidates.

Business Opportunities

The growing interest in reaching Hispanic voters provides existing and prospective businesses the opportunity to provide political candidates, parties, and groups greater services to reach a growing sector of the American electorate.

The millions of dollars spent on Spanish-language television ads by Al Gore and George W. Bush in 2000, the national attention they received and the historic Hispanic turnout contributed to the confidence in this advertising format that led to record levels of spending on Spanish-language television ads during the 2002 campaign. Candidates and consultants gained new insights into the importance of this specialized advertising option in districts or states with close elections and a large number of Hispanic voters.

While spending in 2000 was significant, the millions of dollars spent by individual candidates in 2002 outpaced expenditures by the Bush and Gore campaigns and the parties. The Spanish-language television networks and stations received more than \$16 million in advertising revenues from political candidates and party organizations in the 2002 midterm election. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent on Spanish-language radio advertising, print newspaper advertising, direct mail, automated phone calls, and other media.¹⁶² Spending on Spanish-language ads in the 2004 Democratic presidential primaries and the general election can be expected to outpace 2002 even though recent campaign finance regulations have placed new limits on financing.

The targeted use of specialized media to reach Hispanics in 2000 demonstrates that political campaigns will spend money to reach voters in any effective ways available. The rapid growth of Spanish-language networks, local affiliates in major media markets, and cable television channels in the Hispanic consumer market expand upon the opportunities that were available to the candidates in 2000.

Campaign Structures Must Reflect Hispanic Priority

For presidential campaigns to be successful among Hispanic voters the community needs effective and influential representation at the highest levels of campaign structures. Top strategists need to incorporate Hispanics as a fundamental part of their long-term outlook. By all accounts, Bush adviser Karl Rove has been successful as a result of his effective long-term perspective shaped in Texas politics. The 2000 campaign demonstrates the possibility that Democratic operatives will lose in 2004 and beyond if they do not grant authority to influential strategists that best understand this non-homogenous community and the complex political affiliations¹⁶³ of the nation's Hispanic voters.

High-ranking Hispanics on the Gore campaign did not have sufficient power to influence the campaign's list of top priorities in a way that would have allocated Hispanic outreach additional funding. When forced to compete with other minority groups for advertising, outreach funding and the candidate's time, Hispanics were not given special priority by the Democrats in 2000.

In addition to consulting and staff appointments, Hispanic political strategists must be fully involved with making Spanish-language, bilingual, and English ads that target Hispanic voters in the battleground states. By assembling a team of the nation's leading Hispanic consultants early in the campaign, the Bush and RNC teams had a strategic advantage over the Gore campaign and the DNC. It is critical that presidential campaigns distribute power, independence, and significant financial resources to Hispanic strategists to accomplish their goals in the key battleground states.

Furthermore, presidential campaigns must work to involve Hispanic media consultants on a team, rather than as competing entities. It appears that major statewide candidates in 2002 learned from the 2000 campaign and succeeded in hiring Hispanic consultants to work entirely on advertising aimed at winning the Hispanic vote.¹⁶⁴ The Gore campaign's media structure in 2000 initially created unnecessary competition between Armando Gutierrez and the EMM Creative team. These consultants, and other Democratic strategists, who understand the Hispanic community, would have been more successful working in a stronger team atmosphere that was empowering and less competitive. In addition, the Gore campaign and the DNC often ignored important requests and valuable strategic advice from these consultants in 2000.

Hispanics Must be a Top Priority for the Media and Grassroots Staff

Presidential campaigns have limited resources to devote to the media and grassroots efforts. Media spending usually consumes nearly 85 percent of campaign spending, with grassroots efforts to mobilize voters and get them to the polls often receiving less than fifteen percent. The combination of an intense grassroots field operation that reaches millions of Hispanic voters in key battleground states, and an effective paid and earned media campaign, are key to gaining the support from the Hispanic community that is now critical to winning a close

presidential election. The decisions that are made in a campaign on where to allocate funds and the candidates' time are critical in the final days of an election.

More than ever before, candidates must fully incorporate the Hispanic community into their campaign strategies. Beyond developing strong media and field efforts, they must attend Hispanic events, parades, cultural celebrations, and visit with Hispanics where they live throughout the country. They must set out to publicize efforts to increase Hispanic political participation and the ways their campaigns are making a difference for the community. Campaigns must demonstrate the deep support they have within the community by using credible and popular Hispanic representatives across the nation that represent local and national constituencies within the community. Candidates must develop extensive earned media strategies to keep them in the news while encouraging Hispanic journalists to devote more of their news to the presidential elections.

The political parties at the national, state, and local level must continue to demonstrate how Hispanic interests are aligned with each party's top priorities. The parties must recruit more Hispanic candidates across the nation and provide them with the support they need to win. They need to find creative ways to maintain the growing Hispanic outreach efforts and ensure national funding as the recent changes in the nation's political campaign finance laws go into effect. Top leaders in the Party must make themselves responsible for making Hispanic outreach a top priority. Party leaders need to work to ensure that the nation's growing Hispanic community is fully represented in Congress and state legislatures. Supporting redistricting efforts that put the value of true democratic representation above party politics will result in developing a competitive edge.

Long-Term Investment

The political parties need vision to perceive outreach to Hispanics as a vital long-term investment. Leading Hispanic consultants in the Republican Party discussed this strategy in interviews for this project. They view each campaign cycle as an opportunity to gain new support within the community and slowly dissolve the widespread support for the Democratic Party among Hispanics throughout the country.

Since the beginning of the 2000 campaign, Democratic and Republican officials, candidates, and activists who are learning to speak Spanish have intrigued Hispanic voters who now see them making a real effort to court them. Dozens have learned the language and are poised to take advantage of an opportunity to communicate with a growing segment of the electorate that they once found difficult to reach.

Leading politicians from both parties are traveling more often to Mexico, Puerto Rico, and other Latin American destinations to meet with officials and demonstrate their strong ties to the region. With political interests among Hispanics often closely tied to their homelands, politicians from both parties are spending more time focusing on the foreign policy interests of their Hispanic constituents. Political support for policies friendly to Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Haitians, and Mexicans have played roles in recent elections in Florida, New York, and

California. These are examples of expanded efforts with the Hispanic community that are critical to long-term strategies in the interest of both parties and the Hispanic community.

Special Interest Groups and Third Party Organizations

Spending by the Sierra Club, on hundreds of thousands of dollars of Spanish-language television ads in 2000, represents another emerging political communications strategy. With new campaign finance laws banning soft money spending by the political parties, and limiting the way candidates and the parties raise and spend funds, special interest groups or third party organizations are poised to play an even greater role in the 2000 campaign. These organizations have already begun raising funds for costly advertising campaigns for the presidential election in 2004. Hispanic organizations with party affiliations have an opportunity to assume roles in filling the perceived campaign finance vacuums.

Role of Community Organizers

Community organizations interested in expanding the political power of the community need to continue to expand their efforts to educate and register citizens. Their participation during critical elections can make the difference.

Hispanic community leaders across the nation must work together to build long-term bridges to the political parties that will best benefit the community. Among the leading groups that have been building political ties are the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute (CHCI). The scope of their work has also extended to large-scale voter registration projects across the nation. Among the most successful registration efforts has been the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP), which registered hundreds of thousands of Hispanics to vote in Texas and other southwestern states in the 1980s and 1990s.

Resource Trade-Offs

Presidential campaigns are often a battle of internal priorities that have amplified effects on Election Day. Sometimes the critical decisions are made about message or spending. Hispanic outreach at the presidential level has had an important role in the trade-offs debate for more than two decades, but only recently has it been shown to be critical in many of the most contested battleground states.

Presidential campaign strategists are forced to decide how to allocate limited resources in the final months of elections. The 2000 campaign provides a case study of the difficult choices that are made. The Gore campaign and the Democratic Party's decision-makers sought to divide funds among the most important constituency groups. The George W. Bush campaign and Republican strategists made the same decisions, except among a different list of base and swing

voters. In the future the Democrats will have to break from traditional restraints and spend much more significant funds to maintain, expand, and even win back support among Hispanics.

The 2004 campaign will likely demonstrate whether the prolific spending in California by the Bush campaign was a valuable investment in the future that will pay dividends for Bush and the Republican Party.

The Gore campaign's decision to limit spending in Miami and other Florida media markets was a fateful one. Governor Jeb Bush's resounding victory in the 2002 Florida Governor's race, and his wide margin of victory among Hispanics that surpassed his prior support in 1998, provides added importance to efforts to retain and win support among Hispanics for the Democratic Party. George W. Bush and the national Republican Party have a real advantage going into 2004 as Governor Bush and his statewide organization will provide President Bush a special opportunity to continue to court this crucial bloc.

The Gore campaign's decision to spend heavily on Spanish-language television advertising in Nevada was risky and, in the end, proved to be an inefficient strategy that cost the campaign resources in other key states. Gore lost Nevada by four percent of the vote. At the same time, the Gore campaign's significant spending in New Mexico paid strong dividends in victory.

In these cases, three states, three battleground contests, one win, and two defeats for the Democratic Party strategy. These are the stakes of sensitive spending decisions.

This is the backdrop for the 2004 presidential election.

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND BEYOND

Research into the thorough, yet narrow, topic of Spanish-language media campaigns employed in the 2000 election illuminates some of the larger issues related to shifting demographics of the electorate that will play a role in the 2004 campaign and other future elections.

Democrats interviewed for this project agreed that the rapidly growing number of Hispanic voters in key battleground states, and the stakes involved with the 2004 presidential election, will drive a realignment of priorities within the Party. These issues are central to any discussion on the subject of the long-term strength of the political parties in America. If the Democrats will succeed in taking back the White House in 2004, the Party and its candidate will employ an unprecedented Hispanic outreach effort that will include historic spending on Spanish-language television and radio advertising. The aggressive and successful Hispanic outreach efforts that were waged in 2002 by the Republican Party should have helped place greater focus on these efforts within the Democratic Party.

The interview with Gore's constituency director, Janet Murguia, demonstrated the growing pressure on Democratic political operatives to balance their efforts among the Party's diverse list of "base" constituencies. As the number of Hispanic voters approaches and eventually surpasses the level of participation of African American voters, campaign and party strategists will likely devote a greater proportion of funds to Hispanic outreach. Whether this will cause a decrease in outreach to the African American community is unclear, but it can be expected to raise concern among African American political organizers. Similar concern will likely be raised by the leaders of the diverse Asian American community. While Asian Americans comprised only 2%¹⁶⁵ of the vote in 2000, this community's growing influence in key battleground states, such as California, presents both parties with another ethnic voting bloc to target.

The increasing use of Spanish-language television and radio by both parties raises interest in communications opportunities to reach other American minority groups. For decades Democratic candidates have taken advantage of African American radio stations across the nation for both paid and earned media opportunities. These efforts have helped ensure historic African American turnout on behalf of Democratic candidates in recent elections. The Republican Party's recent successes among Hispanics nationally, and African Americans in select states, have convinced Karl Rove and other Party strategists of the potential opportunity for Republican candidates to use African American radio to draw votes from another Democratic constituency. "In the (2000) election, one of the greatest failures of our campaign was to get 9 percent of the African-American vote," Rove said at an event in December 2002. "No party can be a great party if it does so poorly in such an important part of our great culture." Rove noted that 13,000 Democratic spots that were aired on African American urban radio stations helped ensure a Democratic landslide among African Americans in Kansas City in the 2000 election. While Democrats blanketed urban radio with their message, Republicans only aired six radio spots in the city.¹⁶⁶

The Republican Party and its constituencies face different decisions than Democrats when shifting priorities. President George W. Bush and RNC leadership continue to spearhead an effort to diversify the Party by actively courting both the Hispanic and African American communities and speaking about a “compassionate conservative” agenda. This message may help bring minority voters into the Party, but may also alienate the traditionally white, rural, Christian conservative base of the Party.

“We may have to be more strategic when we look at the targeted base,” Murguia said before the 2002 election. “The blessing of the Democratic Party is that they have a multi-constituency base, but in the future the Party will have to look at how to strike a balance. At some point we will have to tier up to the next level of decision-making. Not mutually exclusive, it’s how you target them, the region, and the medium.” It takes “more communication among the constituency themselves, and strong leadership coming from the party and candidates,” she said. “All the constituencies have to be invested in the outcome... will have to concede the differences in certain states.”¹⁶⁷

Future Spending

With the new campaign finance laws now in effect, the parties are weakened and unable to spend millions of dollars of soft money on advertising. Special interest groups have a new role in the political system and are poised to play a more powerful role in the 2004 presidential election. Millions of dollars more will be spent by these groups on advertising. Spanish-language advertising is sure to be a part of this increased effort if 2000 can serve as an indication.

Growing spending on Spanish-language television advertising is a proven trend. During the 2001 off-year campaigns, major mayoral candidates spent more than \$5.5 million on Spanish-language television ads. With closely contested races in cities with large Hispanic populations such as El Paso and Houston, Texas; Miami, Florida; New York, New York; Los Angeles, California; and a New Jersey Governor’s race, spending on Spanish-language television advertising reached record levels for contests at the local level that year.¹⁶⁸ Record spending on Spanish-language television advertising in the 2002 mid-term elections surpassed \$16 million for gubernatorial, House, Senate, and down-ballot candidates and initiatives.¹⁶⁹

The 2004 campaign promises to involve even more spending as both parties battle for control of the White House and a closely aligned Congress. On the day following the November 5, 2002 midterm election, the leaders of both the DNC and RNC boasted publicly about gains as a result of the Hispanic vote and the importance of this election for Hispanic outreach in 2004.¹⁷⁰ *It is evident, Spanish-language advertising and Hispanic outreach will be central to Democratic and Republican campaign strategies in 2004.*

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD

This project confirms the rapid growth of interest in Spanish-language television advertising in presidential campaigns and the increasing attention it receives from campaign consultants and professionals. It also confirms the rapid growth in Hispanic political power over the past two decades.

This research project contributes to the study of modern presidential campaign efforts to court Hispanic voters. It develops new data on spending and ad placements, and identifies the significance and effectiveness of the strategies and methodologies utilized by the party and campaign organizations to reach Hispanics.

A comprehensive catalogue of nearly every Spanish-language ad run by the parties and the 2000 presidential campaigns can be created for future research. The data sets developed to track ads and spending can be used to form a more comprehensive history of presidential campaign advertising targeting Hispanic voters than has been previously available. From this, researchers will be able to determine percentage shifts in interval variables and additional shifts in ordinal and nominal variables related to presidential media campaigns in the future. By examining the recent history and trends of Spanish-language media campaigns, and through the interviews with campaign professionals, predictions can be made about how future campaigns will reach Hispanic voters. Future research will rely upon this project to demonstrate shifting or static strategies.

The study also helps the academic community better understand the larger context for the rapidly growing phenomenon. The growth in Spanish-language television advertisements across the nation reflects the growing importance of the Hispanic population in American politics. *It also challenges the traditional political coalitions and impressions of constituencies that candidates and parties had taken for granted or entirely written off.*

The rapid growth in Spanish-language campaign television advertising helps illuminate the larger explosion in spending on political television ads nationally. It reflects an extremely unique communications strategy that targets one constituency through niche television stations. However, it also demonstrates the lack of political ingenuity by campaigns with regard to how to reach Hispanic voters and connect to their concerns about political issues that face their communities.

Finally, this project contributes to the understanding of the growing impact Spanish-language television is having on Hispanic populations nationally and on the broader American society.

**APPENDIX I: CAMPAIGN AND PARTY SPANISH-LANGUAGE TELEVISION
SPENDING COMPARISONS, 2000 AND 1996***


	Gore/DNC 2000	Bush/RNC 2000	Clinton-Gore/DNC 1996***
Miami	--	\$785,000	n/a
Orlando	\$68,000	\$57,000	n/a
Tampa	\$61,000	\$82,000	n/a
FL Total:	\$129,000 <i>(lost)</i>	\$924,000 <i>(won, by 537 votes)</i>	\$390,000 <i>(won, by 5% of vote) **</i>
Albuquerque	\$204,000	\$73,000	n/a
NM Total	\$204,000 <i>(won, by 365 votes)</i>	\$73,000 <i>(lost)</i>	\$110,000 <i>(won, by 7% of vote) **</i>
Bakersfield	\$6,000	\$36,000	n/a
Fresno	\$16,000	\$110,000	n/a
Los Angeles	\$127,000	\$940,000	n/a
San Diego	--	\$50,000	n/a
San Francisco	\$38,000	--	n/a
Sacramento	\$18,000	\$19,000	n/a
CA Total	\$205,000 <i>(won, by 9% of vote)</i>	\$1,155,000 <i>(lost)</i>	\$101,000 <i>(won, by 13% of vote) **</i>
Las Vegas	\$186,000	\$45,000	n/a
NV Total	\$186,000 <i>(lost)</i>	\$45,000 <i>(won, by 4% of vote)</i>	n/a <i>(won, by 1% of vote) **</i>
New York	\$118,000	\$2,000	n/a
NY Total	\$118,000 <i>(won, by 25% of vote)</i>	\$2,000 <i>(lost)</i>	\$115,000 <i>(won, by 30% of vote) **</i>
Chicago	\$58,000	--	n/a
IL Total	\$58,000 <i>(won, by 12% of vote)</i>	-- <i>(lost)</i>	\$18,000 <i>(won, by 17% of vote) **</i>
Phoenix	--	\$42,000	n/a
AZ Total	-- <i>(lost)</i>	\$42,000 <i>(won, by 6% of vote)</i>	\$175,000 <i>(won, by 3% of vote) **</i>
Philadelphia	\$60,000	\$90,000	n/a
PA Total	\$60,000 <i>(won, by 5% of vote)</i>	\$90,000 <i>(lost)</i>	n/a <i>(won, by 9% of vote) **</i>
Total:	\$960,000	\$2,274,000	\$909,000

* *Spending data of Dole-Kemp/RNC 1996 efforts were not available.*


** *Source: Almanac of American Politics, 2002.*

*** *Source: Awash in the Mainstream, 1999 (see Notes – 22).*

APPENDIX II: GRAPHS OF VOTING AGE AMERICANS IN 2000




	Total	Registered to Vote	Not Registered to Vote	Reported Voted	Did Not Vote
□ Hispanic Americans	21,598	7,546	14,052	5,934	15,664
■ All Americans	202,609	129,549	73,060	110,826	91,784



Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2000.

**APPENDIX III: GRAPH OF HISPANIC AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, RECENT
PAST AND PROJECTED FOR THE FUTURE**




	1996	2000	2004
□ Voters	4928	5934	7848
▒ Registered Voters	6573	7546	9980
■ Voting-Age Citizens	11209	13158	18012
■ Voting-Age Population	18426	21598	29566


Source: Mobilizing the Latino Vote, National Council of La Raza, 2002.

APPENDIX IV: STATE DEMOGRAPHICS

Hispanic Population by State



Hispanics as a Percent of the Population by State



Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2000.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Adam J. Segal is Director of the Hispanic Voter Project at Johns Hopkins University. The Project is based at JHU's Washington Center for the Study of American Government in Washington, DC.

His research has received major national media attention. *CNN's Inside Politics*, *The New York Times*, *Miami Herald*, *Orlando Sentinel*, *Associated Press*, *EFE Spanish-language News Service*, *The Washington Times*, *The Washington Post*, *National Journal's Hotline*, *ABCNews.com's The Note* and many others have reported on his work.

Segal was raised in Lexington, Massachusetts. He earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and Judaic Studies at The George Washington University in Washington, DC. He earned his Master of Arts in Government at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC. He is a senior associate at a prominent media strategy and public relations firm in Washington, DC.

Segal, his wife and their daughter reside in Silver Spring, Maryland.

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NOTES:

¹ The United States Census Bureau lists the following definition of "Hispanic" for the 2000 Census:

"Hispanics or Latinos are those people who classified themselves in one of the specific Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino categories listed on the Census 2000 questionnaire - "Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano," "Puerto Rican", or "Cuban" -as well as those who indicate that they are "other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino." Persons who indicated that they are "other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino" include those whose origins are from Spain, the Spanish-speaking countries of Central or South America, the Dominican Republic or people identifying themselves generally as Spanish, Spanish-American, Hispanic, Hispano, Latino, and so on. Origin can be viewed as the heritage, nationality group, lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States. People who identify their origin as Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino may be of any race. Thus, the percent Hispanic should not be added to percentages for racial categories. This includes the following origins: Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican; Central American: Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Panamanian, Salvadoran; South American: Colombian, Ecuadorian, Peruvian."
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